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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
A Phenomenological Approach to the Later Films of Terrence Malick
by
Timothy J. Keeley, Jr.
Master of Liberal Arts 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017
Professor Stamos Metzidakis, Chair
Professor Mark Rollins Co-Chair
Professor Ignacio Sánchez Prado, Co-Chair
 The cinematic legacy of Terrence Malick, while not settled because the director still lives 
and makes films, is already a turbulent one. A reclusive philosophy student, Malick’s early 
output accumulated admiration when Malick disappeared from cinema for twenty years. Like so 
many great 20th-century artists, including J.D. Salinger and Thomas Pynchon, Malick’s absence 
grew his legend, so his return was welcomed with anticipation and acclaim. As Malick’s output 
becomes more frequent, though, some are growing cold to his work, asserting that it is repetitive 
and pretentious, and borders on self-parody. Still others charge that Malick was only regarded as 
a genius because his mythic status remained shrouded in mystery. 
 However, I argue Malick’s career turned with the release of his 2011 film The Tree of 
Life. While a preoccupation with the beauty of nature and the duality of man floods Malick’s 
previous films, each film from 2011 to present1 has ventured farther away from traditional 
narrative structure and the audience’s expectations of contemporary American cinema and closer 
v
1 At the time of this writing, these include The Tree of Life (2011), To the Wonder (2012), and Knight of Cups 
(2014).
to a cinematic memoir that blends aesthetic experimentation with a deep interest in the 
historically-influential philosophical notions of immanence and transcendence. 
 While the philosophy of Malick’s films is recognizably Christian, as many critics and 
scholars will note, it runs deeper than that. Malick is concerned with the possibility of the human 
encounter with the sublime to, as Schopenhauer would describe, awaken self-consciousness. 
However, while Schopenhauer would have self-consciousness liberating itself from the will, 
Malick’s account of the sublime and human exaltation reaffirms the individual (his will and his 
intellect, among other things) through self-consciousness that results from a recognition of each 
individual person as also being a part of the story of humanity. In doing so, Malick’s 
phenomenology more closely resembles Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” and conception of 
Being as “grounded” in, yet distinct from, a being. Understood this way, Malick’s choice to 
eschew traditional characterization in his films supports their philosophical interests. 
 Likewise, his cinematography and editing patterns evoke the power of cinema to present 
memory as associated logic and time as free from linearity. My project will also include the 
study of neurocinematics2 to explore how Malick’s experimental aesthetics both underline his 
philosophical ideas and create a divisive experience for the audience. Particular attention will be 
paid to shot composition, elements of mise-en-scène, and editing techniques, specifically the 
duration of individual shots and the effect of juxtaposing different scenes together, to create an 
associative meaning only possible through non-narrative cinema. 
 Finally, I will show how all of this makes for a Romantic humanism, which Harold 
Bloom would describe as “an attempt to transcend the human without forsaking humanism.” 
vi
2 “Neurocinematics” involves the study of the human brain’s response to viewing a film or scene.
Traditionally, transcendence is understood as that which goes beyond the physical level. For 
Malick, though, transcendence is an essential part of the human’s experience of the sublime in 
the natural, physical world -- in a word, “immanence.” Malick, in abstracting the specifics of 
plot, attempts to compose a cinematic representation of the essence of a human life by creating a 
highly-formal aesthetic experience which asks the viewer to consider the metaphysical shining 
through the mundane. Malick should be understood, then, as documenting the American 
experience through a complex aesthetic representation of being, transcendence, and immanence. 
In the final analysis, my project will show how Malick’s aesthetic experimentation engages the 
viewer neurologically in ways that both upset the expectations of narrative cinema and establish 
its own cinematic grammar. The philosophical concerns of Malick’s films -- namely, explorations 
of man’s relationship with the divine through an experience with nature, man’s spiritual journey 
from darkness into light, the fluidity of time and memory, and ontology of the soul -- necessitate 
a distinct style, one which seeks to represent a convergence of transcendence and immanence. 
vii
Introduction
In both academic and amateur conversation, contemporary film studies focuses heavily 
on theoretical contours and schools of thought or on fandom and commercial success. Popular 
film criticism, while growing continually irrelevant to the average reader, aims to persuade its 
audience to see or to avoid a film, while only occasionally offering an analysis of the film’s 
merits as a work of art. Even the rise of film essays on YouTube provide little more than fan 
theories or director idolatry. With the popularization of cinema as a massive force of commerce, 
each film is more a product of mass entertainment and consumer commodity than, for example, 
contemporary painting or sculpture. As a result, the voice of the amateur critic or analyst has 
gained rival cultural currency to that of the film of critic or academic, for certain purposes. The 
elites of the cinematic arts have been pushed into retreat, retrenching in contemporary and late-
twentieth century theoretical methodologies. While this turn in cinematic studies has allowed for 
the growth of the discipline on the university level and yielded many exciting connections with 
its literary equivalent, the full possibility of cinema studies on its own terms has either not yet 
been fully realized, or has been prematurely passed over. 
This academic and critical retreat can be seen in the tendency of film studies to prioritize, 
for example, queer studies and othering, feminist critiques of the male gaze, cinematic 
international cultures and histories, or psychoanalysis over more fundamentally aesthetic 
interpretations. This is not to say that these schools of thoughts are completely devoid of 
engagement with cinematic style and technique. Rather, their discussion of style and technique 
are in service of a larger theoretical point. Andrei Tarkovsky, the Russian filmmaker and film 
theorist, will insist in his reflections in Sculpting in Time, that “the purity of cinema, its inherent 
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strength, is revealed not in the symbolic aptness of images (however bold these may be) but in 
the capactiy of these images to express a specific, unique, actual fact.”1 We often begin with a 
critical conversation or set of ideologies and interpret how the aesthetics of cinema can 
demonstrate those recurrent themes, a top-down approach. All too seldom do we see a discussion 
of how the form and nature of the medium itself allow for different concepts to be explored, 
concepts wholly unique to the cinematic experience itself, a bottom-up approach. As the 
modernists would tell us, new ideas require new forms of expression. Likewise, new forms of 
expression unlock the possibility for new ideas. 
There is a precedent for such a discussion. Andre Bazin’s work in phenomenology and 
Dudley Andrew’s resurrection of that work provide a framework for approaching film studies in 
this manner. Bazin, in “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema,” implodes the idea that was 
common in film academia by the 1960s and 1970s that the advent of sound in movies (around 
1927) robbed cinema of symbolic and impressionistic meaning. Because sound married to an 
image offers a more direct articulation of the events on screen and their importance to the story 
or theme, the viewer was less involved in the creation of meaning in the film as a whole, and the 
filmmakers became lazier and more obvious, not stepping up to the challenge of finding 
innovative and expressionistic ways of moving their pictures. However, to Bazin, this innovation 
marked a new birth of cinema. He writes of filmmaking with sounds, that it is “less a matter of 
setting silence over against sound than of contrasting certain families of styles with certain 
basically different concepts of cinematographic expression.” 2 Sound and silence provided new 
possibilities and marked a difference between “those directors who put their faith in the image 
and those who put their faith in reality.”3 This statement establishes a certain hierarchy of 
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expression which Bazin does not shy away from. He remains, however, leery of “art for art’s 
sake,” reassuring us that “our intention is certainly not to preach the glory of form over content.” 
Rather, “a new subject matter demands new form, and as good a way as any towards 
understanding what a film is trying to say is to know how it is saying it.”4 Bazin’s approach 
prioritizes an understanding of the form and aesthetics before placing a conceptual interpretation 
on the film as a whole, freeing us from the binds of shoehorning a film into pre-existing 
categories of analysis. 5 The need to engage first with the method of cinema comes directly from 
the power of film to impact us immediately, pre-consciously, in ways that written forms for art 
do not. Bazin asserts that “the image -- its plastic composition and the way it is set in time, 
before it is founded on a much higher degree of realism has at its disposal more means of 
manipulating reality and modifying it from within.”6 This observation leads him to posit that 
“The filmmaker is no longer the competitor of the painter and the playwright. He is, at last, the 
equal of the novelist.”7 But even this graduation sells short the direct, immediate impact of the 
moving image and the impression that the combination of image and sound and the juxtaposition 
of competing images can evoke. 
It is for that reason that Andrew resurrects Bazin’s rebellion and argues for a 
reconstitution of phenomenology in film studies. In “The Neglected Tradition of Phenomenology  
in Film Theory” Andrew strongly discredits the ability of psychological and political methods of 
discourse about cinema to respond to emotion. As such, an account for the power of aesthetics 
suffers. The aesthetic that is considered through these methodologies remains skeptical of the 
emotional response, and so does not constitute a complete aesthetic account. As such, Andrew 
champions phenomenology, which he writes is skeptical of rationality and pure reason for their 
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total trumping of all experience.8 Like the understanding of life as a whole, art reveals itself more 
through experience than structure. Phenomenology attempts to come to grips with immediate 
experience by embracing contradiction, paradox and mystery. The introductory paragraph to this 
essay wonders if the phenomenological approach is completely at odds with social and political 
methods of interpretation, or if there is room for cohabitation. 
Andrew wants structuralist approaches to give way to phenomenology (in a dialectical 
way) as he sees structuralism eroding. Essential to his effort is the distinction between “the zone 
of pre-formulation in which the psyche confronts a visual text intended for it, and the zone of 
post-formulation in which the psyche must come to terms with a surplus value unaccounted for 
by recourse to a science of signification.” 9 While an exploration of signification and a study of 
semiotics can and does reveal deeper meaning to the visual representation that film provides, the 
risk of a such a study is the implementation of a set number of interpretations. The limit of signs 
and symbols is that they are preordained to contain a finite number of “correct” meanings; they 
must indicate or signify something else which has already been determined. Phenomenology, on 
the other hand, is rooted more deeply in perception than conception, in imagination, and in 
experience. Andrew notes that “Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Dufrenne, have all attempted to 
describe perceptual, imaginative and aesthetic experience,” 10 and so begins to draw out a history 
of phenomenology. 
He first notes Gilbert Cohen-Seat’s 1945 attempt to describe “filmologie” as “cinema as 
social eruption controlled by alien technology and creating a universal but impersonal dream.”11 
He mentions Stanley Cavell’s The World Viewed as an attempt to describe the cinema as a 
phenomenon among other phenomena. Phenomenology, he writes, is dominated by the study of 
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perception, aesthetic perception.12 We then get Christian Metz’s important essays on film as 
related to memory, cognition, time and space, psycho-physiology, daydreaming, illusion, etc. The 
perception, though, is an elaboration of a world that moves into human signification.13 The key 
to identification is “meditating on the viewer’s shifting mode of consciousness in confrontation 
with various types and organizations of images.”14 Many modes of phenomenology in film focus 
on an account of the consciousness of the spectator as well as identification in relation to a 
sequence of images all directed toward some goal or experience15. Andrew marks the difference 
between pre-formulation and post-formulation as between film criticism and hermeneutics. He 
figures the author as the transcendent creator of worlds which an audience or critic then 
reconstitutes. He then champions Bazin as a critic whose phenomenological writings erase the 
distinction between works and instead recognize the energy of the author.16 He elaborates on the 
world, Bazin does, before then pinpointing a larger source. 
Andrew writes that few American critics “have been able to mimic that speculative aura 
which struggles to go beyond the mere enumeration of repeated elements and to capture the 
quality of the experience we live through with an auteur or a genre.”17 Paul Ricoeur, he writes, is 
also attempting to go beyond the text by enjoying the fruits of the experience of the text, rather 
than taking a first interpretative step back into the origins of ideology of psychoanalysis. Finally, 
Andrew asserts that an over-reliance on grammars and structures of films remove us from direct 
contact with the cinema itself and instead transmigrate our experience to a second logical system. 
“Phenomenology,” he writes, “wants to remain immune to the diseases, antibodies, and critical 
inoculations which have characterized the feverish world of structuralism for the past 15 
years”18. “By according limitless value to experience and by granting all life processes an 
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unquestioned respect, phenomenology seeks to put reason and language at the service of life or at  
least of human experience.”19 Phenomenology, then, is not necessarily closer to truth, but to 
cinema and our experience of it because it is grounded in perception, the momentum and 
narrative, descriptions and interpretations of cinematic worlds, and our emotional involvement in 
the image.
 There are, of course, issues with and limits to Andrew’s application of phenomenology in 
film studies, most prominent of which is its tendency to be too affective, or simply 
impressionistic. In other words, is phenomenology too reliant on the viewer’s subjective 
experience? Do we run into problems that “it’s different for each person” or “your experience 
cannot be wrong”? If so, then this entire effort falls apart. However, I want to suggest here and 
argue in this paper that recent developments in neuroscience and brain imaging lay some 
groundwork for an account of shared aesthetic experiences. “Neurocinematics,” as it is called, 
allows us to discuss how a narrative is arranged and unfolded and how the aesthetics of a frame 
or the construction of sound and editing engage (or fail to engage) that viewer. Neurocinematics 
does not provide an exhaustive account of some supposed universal viewer experience, as we 
will see. After all, an essential component to the experience of the art object is the experience 
and associations one brings to it; however, the discovery of mirror neurons can clue us in to how 
movies affect our brains and orchestrate our emotional responses. 
Combining several elements of phenomenology as laid out by Bazin, Andrew, and Metz, 
with recent developments in the still-fetal field of neurocinematics, I will argue for a 
reconstitution of phenomenology in film studies by analyzing the recent work of American 
filmmaker Terrence Malick, a divisive, yet mammoth, figure in contemporary film. Malick’s 
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filmography straddles the uncomfortable camps of mainstream distribution and arthouse 
philosophy pictures. His films, especially those made in the last six years, have become so 
stubbornly abstract that some suggest Malick be treated more as a philosopher than a filmmaker, 
while others throw up their hands in frustration over what seems to them to be obtuse 
experimentalism and anti-narrative self-indulgence. As a result, Malick’s films are instantly 
recognizable and easily parodied, with some critics suggesting he is unknowingly and 
unintentionally parodying himself. But, I argue, the frustration that naturally occurs from dealing 
with difficult film, especially film which packages itself to be lush, romantic, and just on the 
outskirts of the mainstream, fails to realize the exciting and innovating frontiers that Malick’s 
visual tone poems envision and pioneer. At the risk of sounding like a fanboy baying, “you just 
don’t get it!” I hope to explore in this paper that Malick’s process, style, aesthetics, and affect 
constitute a form of cinema which, like the modernist tomes of English literature, require new 
forms to express their hearts and minds. This is not to call for a complete critical reevaluation of 
Malick’s latest work for the purpose of vindicating his longeurs or resurrecting his reputation. 
Rather, I hope to lay the groundwork for a reapplication of phenomenology in film studies, 
combined with exciting innovations in neuroscience, which will allow us to better evaluate films 
like Malick’s for what they are. In doing so, we can free cinema from the confines of schools of 
theory and the lenses of literary criticism, hopefully seeing film for the immediate, 
impressionistic, spiritual, and psychological medium that it is. 
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Chapter 1: The Philosopher-Filmmaker
 In order to understand both how Malick’s recent films have been mis-evaluated as well as 
where he pulls influence for the essence of his films, we must first extract hints from select 
moments of his biography. While I do not wish to suggest a deterministic understanding of 
authorial intent (thus committing the Intentional Fallacy and upsetting the Wimsatt and 
Beardsley gods), it is clear to me that Malick’s abnormal path to behind the camera informs the 
oddities that are imprinted on his film, as with most any other artist or philosopher.
 Malick’s upbringing has the all imprints of introspective Midwestern mind. Born in 1943 
in Ottawa, IL, Malick was raised in Waco, TX, until young adulthood. While little is known of 
the highlighted moments of so many kunstleromans, we know that Malick attended St. Stephen’s 
Episcopal School in Austin, TX, and that he was the oldest of three sons born to Irene and Emil.1 
His younger brother, Larry, was a self-sabotaging musician, whose suicide as a young man likely  
influenced several essential subplots in Malick’s autobiographical films. In 1965, Terry 
graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa with an A.B. in philosophy from Harvard 
University. He attended Magdalen College in Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, but left before 
completing a degree after having a falling out with his mentor and adviser.2 The focus of 
Malick’s work as a philosophy student in Oxford concerned Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and 
Kierkegaard, names which continue to form Malick’s creative mind and names which we will 
revisit to far greater extent later in this essay. 
 Upon returning the U.S. in 1969, Malick’s academic work merged into storytelling. After 
his translation of Heidegger’s Vom Wessen des Grundes as The Essence of Reasons was 
published by Northwestern University Press, Malick taught philosophy at Massachusetts Institute 
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of Technology and worked as a freelance journalist for Newsweek, The New Yorker, and Life. 
Meanwhile, Malick also pursued and completed an MFA from the AFI Conservatory.3 His thesis 
film was a short called “Lanton Mills,” a comedy starring himself, Warren Oates, and Harry 
Dean Stanton. The film centers on two cowboys who hatch and carry out a plan to rob a bank. 
One reviewer remarked that the film was 
Visually, rich in elements that  would become Malick's trademarks. Daylight 
assumes a tactile presence — though here it is not the diffuse “magic hour” light 
(i.e., malick-light) of later films, but a bold late afternoon sun that  streams through 
leaves, creating shadow and dappled highlight on the characters' faces. The camera 
angles tend to be either wide or wider, even in dialogue scenes. Also familiar from 
Malick's later films is the attention to landscape and nature.... But what makes 
"Lanton Mills" feel completely different from Malick's later work is its 
unrestrained, anarchic comedy. ... Though the jokes play out in an absurdist, 
disconcerting key, they still make us laugh (or at least shake our heads with a 
puzzled smile)4
Malick wrote the film score himself and legendary cinematography (though not in 1969) Caleb 
Deschanel served as the director of photography. 
 As is the benefit of attending film school, Malick developed strong relationships with 
rising talents in the film industry. Agent Mike Medavoy helped garner script doctoring work for 
Malick, leading to screen credits such as Dirty Harry (1971), Drive, He Said (1971), Pocket 
Money (1972), and The Gravy Train (1974). One of his own original screenplays, Deadhead 
Miles was made into a road comedy in 1973 starring Alan Arkin and featuring appearances by 
Ida Lupino and George Raft. Producers at Paramount deemed the film “unreleasable,” a label 
which has kept the film hidden to this day.5 Though the Vernon Zimmerman-directed film 
remains buried in film history, it’s logline about a runaway pursuing revenge on the police can be 
heard echoing through Malick’s breakout feature Badlands (1973). 
10
 Another criminals-hit-the-road film, Badlands reunites Malick with Warren Oates, in a 
supporting role, and provided star-making turns for Martin Sheen and Sissy Spacek. Malick also 
collaborated with production designer Jack Fisk, a creative partnership that continues to this day. 
While bearing marks of his earlier films, Badlands would begin to establish visual and narrative 
motifs and styles that would become synonymous with their maestro’s name. The story of Kit 
and Holly falling in love and hitting the road, as well as Kit’s repeated random acts of violence, 
especially against law enforcement, continue a trend seen in Deadhead Miles, “Lanton Mills,” 
Pocket Money, The Gravy Train, and even, to some extent, Dirty Harry. The aforementioned 
visual style, preferent to natural lighting, produces a gorgeously romantic backdrop for the film, 
a backdrop which stands in stark contrast to the ugliness of the human violence being perpetrated 
in front of it. This theme -- the juxtaposition of the indifferent beauty of nature with man’s 
propensity for evil and destruction -- will remain a fascination of Malick’s, a reenacting of Man’s 
rejection of Eden and a remembrance of that first of fratricide and disobedience. 
 Still, Badlands exorcises some of Malick’s early interests which will soon fade from his 
artistic imagination. Like the screenplays that bear his name as a contributor, Badlands centers 
on a James Dean-esque renegade, that rebellious child of the late 1950s and icon of the American 
counter-culture which independent film through Hollywood’s Renaissance would wield to great 
effect. His casting of Spacek’s Holly as a feminine innocence confronted with, but untouched by 
the guilt of man’s existential destruction, will be the first in a line of underdeveloped female 
characters throughout his filmography. The use of reflective and poetic voice-over, though here 
confined to just one point-of-view, will lend Malick’s films their subjective and spiritual insight. 
And let’s not overlook the ethereal score, like a symphony from heaven, or his blatant disregard 
11
for the authority of man for the sake of something sacred: here the American Romantic hero over 
The Man and The Law; later the dictates of narrative and film grammar and vocabulary for songs 
of the soul and epiphanies of immanence and transcendence. Unfortunate to some, Badlands will 
also mark the end of Malick’s sense of humor in his films. A darkly comic tone resonates deep 
under the pastoral landscapes and murderous inclinations of the main character. The tagline of 
the film flippantly states, “In 1959, a lot of people were killing time, Kit and Holly were killing 
people.” Another: “He was 25 years old. He combed his hair like James Dean. He was very 
fastidious. People who littered bothered him. She was 15. She took music lessons and could twirl 
a baton. She wasn't very popular at school. For awhile they lived together in a tree house. In 
1959, she watched while he killed a lot of people.”6 The bluntness of this summary now sounds 
more like The Coen Brothers than what we have come to know from Malick. While likely not 
branded by the director himself, these taglines do reveal both an audience awareness and an 
impulse to locate Badlands within an emerging subgenre of anti-hero runaway lovers, a trope we 
will see reiterated in Bonnie and Clyde, Thelma and Louise, The Living End, Natural Born 
Killers, and many others. It is worth noting, too, that the concise, blunt statements lend a 
Hemingway-esque masculinity to the marketing of the film, an assertion that does not vindicate 
Holly, either. After all, “She watched.”
 So, while Badlands, coming on the feet of Deadhead Miles, can be read as a reworking of 
that film by a frustrated auteur, Days of Heaven (1978) begins to shed these early Malick 
concerns for some more stereotypically-trademark Malick-isms. The infamous shoot would go 
over-schedule and over-budget, deferring from producer oversight and contemporary wisdom as 
to how studio pictures should be made. After the critical acclaim received by Badlands, Malick 
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was granted a $3 million budget (a sizeable improvement over the $450,000 price tag on 
Badlands)7 and landed Richard Gere, Brooke Shields, and Sam Shepherd as his stars. Jack Fisk 
returned as production designer, and Malick enlisted the help of Nestor Almendros as 
cinematographer and Ennio Morricone to compose the score. While still boasting a love story 
cast against a romantic American past, Days of Heaven gets far more ethereal than Badlands. An 
eccentricity indeed, Badlands feels deeply rooted in American 1970s cinema, while Days of 
Heaven carries the poetic grace and meandering we have come to associate with the director. 
Sure, at the center of the plot, there remains a con job on “The Man,” but plot is tertiary to 
landscape and atmosphere. Among the more memorable elements of Days of Heaven are 
Morricone’s dream-like score and the gorgeous cinematography which takes extensive (and some 
rumors have it, exclusive) use of “magic hour,” that hour during sunrise and sunset where 
shadows fall large, lighting is balanced and warm, and everything seems to glow like a 
Rembrandt painting. Likewise, the narrative voice-over is more direct, clearly emanating from a 
character and commenting on the plot that we are seeing, adding voice, tone, and cinematic 
footnotes. Running just 94 minutes (the same length as Badlands), Days of Heaven grasps for the 
spiritual ambition of Malick’s later work. It’s epic scope comes more from its elusiveness and 
timelessness than from the grandiose assertion of its own far-reaching ambition. Still, like many 
of Malick’s later films, Days of Heaven seems to be composed more of memorable moments 
than standing as one cohesive whole. The iconic wheat field fire and the swarm of locusts stand 
as exemplars of my point. The meaning of the title, while not immediately clear, can perhaps be 
illuminated by the tagline: “You’ve got to go through Hell before you get to Heaven.”8 This 
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Dantean path will be retrod by many a Malick protagonist on his way through existential crisis to 
salvation. 
 Then Malick goes into hiding. His twenty-year absence from film creates a myth behind 
the mystery and allows his two features to grow in esteem and reverence. Seen as a genius ahead 
of his time, Malick undergoes a self-imposed exile to France before returning to the U.S. and to 
cinema with his 1998 film The Thin Red Line. Like many great artists of the twentieth century -- 
J.D. Salinger, Stanley Kubrick, Banksy, Thomas Pynchon -- Malick’s absence not only grows his 
legend, but informs his work. The elusive character behind the camera parallels the elusive 
character at the heart of the films themselves. Upon returning to the U.S., Malick adapts James 
Jones’s WWII novel of the same name with a $52 million budget and cast that includes Sean 
Penn, Nick Nolte, John Cusack, George Clooney (in what amounts to a cameo), Mirando Otto, 
Jim Caveziel, Adrien Brody, Elias Koteas, Woody Harrelson, Jared Leto, John C. Reilly, Nic 
Stahl, Thomas Jane, John Savage, Kirk Acevedo, and Tim Blake Nelson. Perhaps more 
memorable than this remarkable cast, though, is the names left out of the picture and on the 
cutting room floor. Viggo Mortensen, Gary Oldman, Martin Sheen, Mickey Rourke, Billy Bob 
Thornton, Lukas Haas, Jason Patric, and Bill Pullman all shot scenes and recorded, in Thornton’s 
case, hours of voice-over that would never see final cut. Neither would several hours of music 
composed by Hans Zimmer.9 Rumors speak of a five-plus-hour first cut, which would be 
whittled down to a 215-minute cut, and then again trimmed to 170 minutes for theatrical release. 
Shot over 100 days, Malick’s style could generously be described as “spontaneous,” and less 
generously as “unfocused.” He would often rewrite portions of the script the night before 
shooting and divert the camera’s attention away from expensive and thoroughly choreographed 
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action sequences to focus on a parrot nearby. While this improvisational and meandering style 
will become characteristic of Malick, for some it is his Achilles heel. Adrien Brody attended the 
premiere of the film under the impression he was the star only to find that his role had been cut 
to just a few lines. A later collaborator, Christopher Plummer, would become so frustrated with 
the director’s negligence towards actors and preference for nature that he would vow never to 
work with Malick again.10 
 While The Thin Red Line marked the return of Malick to filmmaking, the auteur ex-pat 
bore little resemblance to the promising writer-director of Badlands and Days of Heaven. Upon 
release, The Thin Red Line was met with a tepid critical response and only earned $35 million of 
its $52 million budget back at the box office.11 The film was nominated for seven Academy 
Awards, including Best Picture and Best Director and Best Adapted Screenplay for Terrence 
Malick himself. Neither Malick nor the film’s producers would attend the ceremony and the film 
would go home empty-handed. The similarity in subject matter to Steven Spielberg’s far more 
accessible and immediate Saving Private Ryan did not help The Thin Red Line’s Oscar hopes, but 
neither did its singular and unnamable style. After three-and-a-half months of shooting, thirteen 
months in editing and four months in sound mixing, Malick had an enigmatic war film and 
increasingly-puzzling technique on his hands. While some gravitated toward the director’s 
spontaneity, others were repulsed by it. Actors Martin Sheen and John Savage reportedly stayed 
on set another month after their scene were shot just to see Malick work. Production designer 
Jack Fisk revealed in an interview that Malick “is always very willing, eager to change things. 
He’d see something in the yard and say, ‘Let’s put that in the bedroom.’ That’s one thing I 
learned from him: spontaneity.”12 Likewise, on Malick’s follow-up film The New World (2005), 
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he will begin a long-time collaboration with cinematography Emmanuel Lubezki, a three-time 
Oscar winner from Mexico. We will revisit Lubezki later to discuss his style in more detail, but 
for now, it is worth noting that he says of Malick,
Working with Terry has changed my life. I'm a different parent, I'm a 
different husband, and I'm a different friend. I see nature in a different way 
since I started working with Terry. I have much more respect for things that 
I wasn't aware of as much. He is one of the most important teachers in my 
life. And I'm a much better cinematographer in helping directors in a much 
more comprehensive way.13
The difference in Lubezki’s work before and after collaborating with Malick is clearly evident. 
There is a freedom to his camerawork that appears at once precise and spontaneous. This illusion 
of spontaneity aids in the overall sense that the films are capturing an unique moment in nature at 
the moment it is occurring. Lubezki recalls about working on The New World: 
Terry came to me and said, ‘I would love to try this, and if we fail, I will 
never use it. I would never put anything in the movie that would humiliate 
you or makes you feel uncomfortable, but let's just try to go to the edge of 
the abyss, because that's where the best images are.' Once he said that and 
allowed me that freedom to fail, I was free of all those rules and regulations 
that were imposed by going to film school and reading all those manuals.14
Lubezki’s cinematography would be recognized by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Sciences with a nomination for Best Cinematography, but Lubezki did not win the award. The 
film would lose $18 million of its $30 million budget,14 a “flop,” and would be cut and reissued 
in three versions: 135 minutes, 150 minutes, and 172 minutes. The New World is often 
considered a beautiful misfire, but it hardly dissolved Malick’s ability to get a film made. 
After another six-year hiatus, Malick would release The Tree of Life in 2011 to universal 
acclaim. With a budget and gross on par with The New World, The Tree of Life bombed at the 
box office, but picked up three Oscar nominations -- Best Picture, Best Director for Malick, and 
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Best Cinematography for Lubezki. The film went home empty-handed, and Malick was a no-
show again. Upon its release, however, The Tree of Life was met with a standing ovation at the 
Cannes Film Festival and took home the Palme d’Or that year. Often regarded as one of the best 
films of the decade, the twentieth century, and, often, of all-time, The Tree of Life stands as 
Malick’s masterpiece, unequalled in scope, ambition, and emotional impact by any of his work 
before or since. 
Considerable space and thought in this essay will be devoted to The Tree of Life as well 
as to Malick’s next two films, To the Wonder (2012) and Knight of Cups (2015). Suffice it to say 
for now that after Malick’s hiatus between Days of Heaven and The Thin Red Line, there is a 
marked change in the director’s work. While the style and scope of his epic films does not vary 
much in the past twenty years, the three films that are the focus of this paper have become 
increasingly abstract and impressionistic. They also continue to gesture toward immanence and 
transcendence while becoming increasingly intimate and autobiographical. All are shot by 
Lubezki, designed by Fisk, scored by Alexandre Desplat and Hanan Townsend, and are edited by 
a team of five editors. They feature some similar actors and are all set in their contemporary time 
period, with The Tree of Life dipping generously into the past. Because of these stylistic 
similarities and the parallels with Malick’s own biography, I find it appropriate to group these 
three films into a pseudo-trilogy, or perhaps triptych. In addition, while his next film Voyage of 
Time (2015) bears some resemblance to portions of The Tree of Life, it is essentially a nature 
documentary and marks enough of a break from the previous three films to be excluded from this 
study, although it is still undeniably Malickian. Moreover, Malick’s next two films, Song to Song 
(2017), a love triangle in the contemporary Austin music scene, and Radegund (2018), a WWII 
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biography, appear to break with this intimate, autobiographical trend, with the producers of Song 
to Song promising a more traditional narrative, and Radegund diving decidedly into the past. 
For our purposes now, though, let’s define the “Malickian” style based on the director’s 
most recent work. Visually, we can identify a film as “Malickian” when it uses natural lighting, 
wide-angle lenses, and a floating camera. A Malick film makes extensive use of the golden hue 
of magic hour and favors shooting against open exteriors and endless horizons. When a Malick 
film goes inside, the domestic space can isolate a character or become his/her playground. Often 
these spaces have large glass windows and screens, hardwood floors, lamps, and curtains. The 
modern, open-floor aesthetic allows for Malick’s improvisational staging. A Malick film 
gravitates toward shadows cast long by the evening sun. It wanders through open fields and 
gazes up at tall trees. It traces a character’s hand as it graces tall grass, their feet as dance and 
twirl. The physical choreography of a character’s movement in relation to another says more than 
their sparse lines of dialogue can express. Characters express themselves more through these 
dancer-like, restless motions and whispery, opaque and poetic voice-overs than they do through 
the traditional give-and-take of dialogue. Malick’s characters wander through old ruins, empty 
buildings, rooftops, deserts, open fields, large staircases, cathedrals, and beaches… so many 
beaches. The relationship of a character to his/her environment is more important than the 
continual pursuit of his/her concrete goal. The journey is spiritual and existential, rather than 
career-centered or based on accomplishment. 
Furthermore, the Malick film makes extensive use of classical music, or a score that 
imitates one. These pieces, often soaring and evocative, conjure a longing for the sublime and 
gesture toward classic Romanticism. Coupled with the ballet-like blocking of the characters, 
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Malick’s films more closely resemble expressionistic operas than traditional narrative film. His 
characters are archetypical, as one will whisper in The Thin Red Line, “all faces are the same 
man.” As a result, Malickian cinema is less concerned with the development of characters and 
their pursuit of a concrete goal than in expressing a soul’s inner longing for connection with 
nature, human beings, divine love, the essence of being, transcendence, and the sublime. It is for 
these reasons that Malick’s films require different modes of expression. They must forge their 
own grammar and vocabulary in order to express that which few others in the medium have so 
aspired to, with, perhaps the exception of Ozu, Bresson, Bergman, Herzog, Tarkovsky, Carne, 
and possibly Tarr, Diaz, and Weerasethakul. 
Malick, though, is unique among Americans. His closest equivalent is Harmony Korine 
who occupies more the role of a provocateur or enfant terrible than a philosopher. It is precisely 
because Malick is peerless, so in a league of his own that he requires special diagnoses and 
categorization and, I argue, that he is largely kept at bay. While some will charge that Malick is 
pretentious and gets a free pass because his admires confuse obstuseness for profundity, others 
like A.O. Scott and Manhola Dargis situate Malick alongside the practitioners of “Slow Cinema,” 
the patron saints of the slow and the boring. This tag, the slow and the boring, was lovingly and 
defiantly applied by Dargis and Scott to their own tastes in a New York Times editorial. Within 
the cultural conversation about entertainment vs. art cinema, Dargis and Scott claim the need to 
eat one’s cultural vegetables and dare suggest that those who claim to like those vegetables may 
not be lying. 
In refutation of Dan Kois’s rebuke of “slow-moving, meditative” and “stately, austere” 
and “deliberately-paced” films, Dargis and Scott defend the aspirational viewing of difficult 
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films while reappropriating which films might be considered “boring.”16 For Dargis, The 
Hangover Part II is boring, even though it is widely liked, because it is so “aggressively 
packaged” into something you must like that it is filled with repetitive gags and similar scenes.17 
It seems so safe and obsessed with the need to be liked, that its stupidity renders it boring, in that 
Warholian sense. For Warhol, “popism,” that is, what everyone is supposed to like that it is 
repackaged and readministered in barely-inseparable forms, bores the careful viewer because it 
repeats and reapplies the original meaning so forcefully that it becomes devoid of meaning. 
Instead, for Warhol, Dargis and Scott, that which is different and aspirational is exciting 
and entertaining, even if it is almost aggressively not so. Dargis submits Bela Tarr’s Satantango 
as an example, a seven-hour, black-and-white epic, chock full of long static takes. The movie, 
Dargis writes, “restores a sense of duration, of time and life passing, that most movies try to 
obscure through continuity editing.”18 So, “faced with duration not distraction, your mind may 
wander, but there’s no need for panic: it will come back. In wandering, there can be revelation as 
you meditate, trance out, bliss out, luxuriate in your thoughts, think.”19 The immediate counter to 
Dargis’s claim asks why we need to go to the movies for meditation. Isn’t that for church or yoga 
class? The movies should be for entertainment and escapism. That retort gets right to the heart of 
the disagreement. If movies are just for unplugging, then Tarr’s seven-hour snorefest misses the 
mark. If, however, we approach film as something more challenge, as having the potential to 
achieve the heights of great novels or paintings, then perhaps Dargis and Scott are on to 
something. Indeed, cinematographer Rahul Jain says, “let painters talk about paint, and 
musicians talk about guitars or sound. I think filmmakers need to talk about time as the primary 
unit of cinema. We need to think about how we experience time in a variety of different ways. 
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When you're old, time passes so fast. When I was young, it was so slow. I wish filmmakers were 
thinking more about time.”20 If the fundamental unit of cinema is time, then these outlier 
filmmakers, these pretentious philosophers, might be stretching the medium to its full potential 
or daring to use it for what fundamentally defines it as an art. Entertainment, for Dargis, is 
distraction from the mundane lies that lie before. Whereas that which we normally deem slow 
and boring are invitations to meditate, to do the slow and painful work of reflecting and thinking. 
Scott ups the ante suggesting that “movies may be the only art form whose core audience 
is widely believed to be actively hostile to ambition, difficult, or anything that seems to demand 
too much work on their part.”21 We often tend this way because film seems so democratic and 
populist, a sort of church that welcomes everyone, the aesthete and the Philistine. Scott brings up 
Richard Schickel’s protest against The Tree of Life winning the Palme d’Or. Schickel writes that 
Malick’s film is “inept,” full of “twaddling pretenses” and that it gets the medium wrong. Film, 
he argues, is “an essentially worldly medium, playful and romantic, particularly in America, 
where, on the whole, our best directors have stated whatever serious intentions they may harbor 
as ignorable asides.”22 As Scott acknowledges, charges of “boring” or “pretentious” are hard to 
refute because of their subjective nature, but he posits the opposite -- that sincerity is the 
opposite of pretentiousness and The Tree of Life brims with “disarming sincerity.” “While it is 
certainly possible to be puzzled or annoyed by Mr. Malick’s philosophical tendencies or 
unmoved by the images he composes or the story he tells, I don’t think there’s any pretending 
involved,”23 Scott writes. His claim, too, is far too subject to substantiate, but it does adequately 
get to the core of this culture war at the heart of slow and boring cinema, that’s difficulty 
somehow excludes the democratic masses and so is snobby, elite, and disordered. What else it 
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reveals is that “serious” is a bad word in this culture conversation and that asking someone to 
think is suspect. Scott allows room for the popcorn entertainment, but requests a seat at the table 
for the serious and the ambitious, a seat not just dismissed to the side table of festival-goers and 
snobs. 
However, the most important concept that arises from this conversation, even if subtlely 
so, is the tension between entertainment and time. I will argue that “entertainment” like “boring” 
is a word whose meaning should not be assumed. We tend to use “entertaining”24 to suggest a 
quality that keeps our attention and so eliminates the awareness of what we are doing as we are 
doing it. Thus, it dissolves our experience of time elapsing; it collapses duration. But what gets 
lost here is in “popcorn” film, the entertaining is something that film does to you, not something 
that it actively and consciously invites you to do. As a result, an awareness of the experience of 
time is a symptom of boredom. 
 Still, the charge that a film is “boring” feels pedestrian and under-cooked. It risks 
sounding pretentious and pedantic to insist that detracts merely do not understand what the artist 
is trying to do. Yet, for the purposes of this essay, that premise bears important significance. To 
ground us in something more than “you don’t get it,” we can turn to Ellen Winner’s book, 
Invented Worlds: The Psychology of the Arts for a defense of authorial intention and a certain 
degree of expertise when evaluating “difficult” art. Winner points out that many audiences and 
critics, “all assume that art serves the same need, or set of needs, for all people. And because any 
given work of art satisfies the same need in all individuals, there should be minimal 
disagreement about which works are the most satisfying.”25 In truth, we find the contrary with 
difficult and ambitious art. The evaluation of art’s merit should not be a democratic enterprise, as 
22
unpopular as that might be to suggest. While there is value and credence to the box office 
success of a particular film, indicating that it at least appealed to large swaths of the audience 
population, mere popularity does not determine artistic excellence. But the uttering of the phrase 
is call for alarm, as it suggests that some viewers are more adept at recognizing better art than 
others, and that such a thing as “better” can even exist, albeit aside from mass appeal. But 
Winner will continue to support our argument by writing,  
how familiar a person is with the arts may influence the kind of art that is 
preferred… other studies have shown that people familiar with the arts, such as 
artists and students of art history, have aesthetic preferences that diverge 
consistently from those of people lacking familiarity with the arts. For instance, 
people who are knowledgeable about the arts base their aesthetic judgments on 
goodness of composition, while those without special knowledge of the arts base 
their judgements on degree of realism and type of subject matter.26
Because of the democratization of the consumption of film, no one wants to be told that 
his/her preference is unsophisticated or his/her expertise and knowledge uninformed. 
Indeed, there is a place for the merely entertaining in film, and some films manage to 
bridge the gap between broad audience appeal and the favor of those who are familiar 
with the arts.27 Yet, the undeniable truth remains that those films which are deemed 
excellent are initially unpopular, and one need not look further than the critical and box 
office reception of the films of Orson Welles and David Lynch -- not to mention, Malick 
-- to see this difficult truth demonstrated. 
 Winner will tell us that the general audience appreciates and expects harmony. We 
are taught to look for consistency and coherence in our narrative and our symbolic 
visuals. There is an unspoken contract between filmmaker and audience that whatever the 
viewer is being shown is immediately relevant to decipher the literal and symbolic 
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meaning of a text. Any obscurity or red herrings are often treated more as failure than as 
the mark of an individual stylist. But, as Tarkovsky tells us, even the sometimes sloppy 
sentences and long digressions of Tolstoy should be understand as individual marks, 
rather than errors that mar his perfection. It is, in fact, these imperfections, these 
diversions from the completely safe that should be not only permitted but appreciated as 
unique signatures of an artist like Tolstoy.28 On the same note, A.O. Scott will defend The 
Tree of Life for its ending and its dinosaur sequence by arguing, 
More than any other active filmmaker, Mr. Malick belongs in the visionary 
company of homegrown romantics like Herman Melville, Walt Whitman, 
Hart Crane, and James Agee. The definitive writing of these authors did 
not sit comfortably  or find universal favor in their own time. They can still 
feel ungainly, unfinished, lacking polish and perfection. This is precisely 
what makes them alive and exciting.29 
Because these diversions seem to tarnish the perfection of a piece or not sit comfortably 
with universal favor, the causal audience dismiss them or outright disdains them, but 
Winner insists that “A high tolerance of complexity might lead to superior aesthetic 
judgment. It might also be that individuals with greater independence of judgment arrive 
at superior aesthetic evaluations.”30 For Winner, a sophisticated understanding of an art 
form requires “discrimination, intellect, and feeling.” Furthermore, 
reading and making sense of a work of art, perceiving subtle differences 
and making fine discriminations, are what give pleasure to the aesthetic 
experience. And the satisfaction granted by gaining an understanding of a 
work of art is independent of whether or not a work is considered pleasing. 
The ability to make relevant discriminations does not unfold 
automatically; rather, it  may  well hinge on familiarity  with the arts, on 
motivation, and perhaps even on cognitive style.31 
Again, we can see the danger here of anointing bad form as high art, when it lacks an interior 
consistency of meaning and expression. But, again, turning to Tarkovsky, we can see that content 
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and conscience must come before and primary to technique and style (though it becomes 
increasingly hard to divorce those from each other). In summary, the difficulty or inaccessibility 
of a text to the average should not on its own constitute greatness. Ambition alone is not enough. 
But neither should it be dismissed outright as pretension or some failure on the part of the artist, 
because we cannot assume, for instance, that Malick’s (or Tarkovsky’s) goal with their art is the 
same as Steven Spielberg’s or Christopher Nolan’s. My argument for the reevaluation of 
Malick’s films along a different criteria should be understood less as a vindication of his 
indulgences and more as an argument for an understanding of an artist on his own terms. When 
one like Malick attempts something different from those cinematic expressions that came before 
him, then a different criteria for the success of his expression must be applied. 
 My methodology in the following chapters, in addition to making use of 
phenomenology as it relates to time and memory, will be heavily rooted in an assertion 
that the auteur theory can have some significant bearing on our ability to read inter-
textually across a filmmaker’s oeuvre. Briefly, I must take a note from Andrew Sarris’s 
“Notes on Auteur Theory,” to provide the framework for this study. Sarris conceptualizes 
the auteur theory as three concentric circles. The broadest circle represents technique; the 
middle circle stands for style; and the inner circle contains inner meaning. By 
“technique,” he refers most to the means by which an artist achieves his aesthetic 
purposes. By “style,” Sarris imagines the artistic qualities that works by the same artist 
share. For a cinema artist, this could refer to cinematography, editing patterns, rhythm, 
etc. And finally, by “inner meaning,” Sarris means some sort of soul to the film the bears 
the director’s fingerprint or personality as an artist.32 Perhaps it is said better by the Los 
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Angeles Times Book Review in its write-up on Sculpting in Time: “Content and 
conscience must come before technique -- for any artist in any art form.”33 So, while 
ample and considerable time will be afforded in this essay to Malick’s style and technique 
as a way into discussing his “inner meaning,” the heart and soul of the argument lies in 
the content and conscience of Malick’s films.
While it is hard to deny the direct correlation between one’s enjoyment of a film and the 
number of times one glances at his/her timepiece, this desire to eradicate the experience of time 
risks woefully undervaluing what might be the fundamental unit of cinematic expression. What 
Jain suggested is not new. In the 1970s, Tarkovsky wrote extensively on how he considered 
filmmaking to be “sculpting in time.” If time is precious and fundamental to cinematic 
expression, then surely it deserve a more careful and considerate treatment than the desire for it 
to be ignored outright. 
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Chapter 2: “Sculpting in Time”
Perhaps Tarkovsky is Malick’s closest neighbor in terms of the contemplation and 
expression of time in his films. While Linklater’s Boyhood bears resemblance to Malick’s The 
Tree of Life in content, the spiritual focus, editing patterns, and cinematographic representation 
drive a bit of a wedge between the two. Tarkovsky, though, will highlight time as the primary 
unit of cinema, building off of and separating his own ideas and expression from Sergei 
Eisenstein’s essays on and practice of the subject. While not a direct descendent of Tarkovsky, 
Malick’s expression of time and rhythm through editing, but more importantly, through 
composition, contain enough of a theoretical root in the work of Tarkovsky to bear comparison. 
It is an added plus that Tarkovsky wrote extensively on the topic in his book Sculpting in Time.
In order to understand the importance of time to the cinema, we must first establish, as 
Tarkovsky does in “Imprinted Time,” that “Time is a condition for the existence of our ‘I.’”1 
Cinema, like the individual subjective experience is only possibly because of the existence of 
time. Tarkovsky writes, “once the links are severed between the individual personality and the 
conditions of existece... the moment of death is also the death of individual time.”2 We find this 
at the end of Malick’s The Tree of Life and throughout Knight of Cups. In the latter, the chapter of 
the film entitled “Death” is the only one that brings forth life. At the beginning of the film, we 
are introduced to Rick (Christian Bale) our pilgrim wanderer as he walks through the boundless 
desert. This shot -- and the returns to it throughout the film -- call to mind Jack’s (Sean Penn) 
wanderings through the desert in The Tree of Life. In Tree, this landscape represents the moment 
after death, passing from the material and natural world into some sort of heaven beyond. But, in 
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Knight, Ricks begins his journey along the same path where Jack ends his. We could assume that 
all of Knight takes place as a memory recalled at the exact moment of Rick’s death. However, a 
more symbolic reading is appropriate here and affords us a richer understanding of Malick’s 
voyage of time. By beginning where Tree ends, Malick reinforces his idea that time, as 
experienced on earth, does not bind itself to linearity, but still takes root in cause and effect. By 
the end of the film, Rick passes through similar vistas, but whispers “Look. Remember. Begin.” 
over the soundtrack. This narrative gesture suggests that the entire film, whether experienced in 
the first time for Rick or through memory, assumes a circular structure, not divorced from cause 
and effect. And so, each reiteration of an event in Rick’s life through the act of remembering and 
through the phenomenon of memory becomes at once real again and takes on a new and 
important meaning for the man’s whose journey goes from death to life, from absence to 
meaning. For Tarkovsky, and for Malick, time is not limited to linear time, but also must bear 
consideration in the relationship between cause and effect. In realizing this connection, man is 
able to return to his past because the past and the present become linked. In doing so, time 
becomes essential for memory. Tarkovsky calls memory “a spiritual concept” in that it gives 
“gives [each person] the opportunity of knowing himself as a moral being.”3 In Rick’s 
Kierkegaardian journey as a “knight of the faith,” actions that ground him in the process of 
becoming rescue him from death, a death that takes form in merely the absence of life, of being 
an onlooker or a stranger in one’s own present experience. Grace builds on nature, as Augustine 
will tell us. The existential man realizes his being through actions that make him a being in time. 
Still, the empty and vast expanses of desert should not be merely seen as some wasteland 
of damnation, some “ruins-porn,” as Peter Bradshaw writing for The Guardian would have it.4 
30
While emptiness implies an absence of some great presence or some great building before, the 
absence and the emptiness contains within it a key to the remebrance of the past. For the 
Romantic, old ruins, old things, find their essence in being a link to a time past, a purpose that 
surpasses their purposiveness intended in their creation -- their utility. One recalls Shelley’s 
“Ozymandias,” which reminds us that even after things are long past, when great men are dead 
and their memories laid waste, that “nothing beside remains.” This rich phrase carries two 
meanings. First, it is a lament that there is nothing except remains, that what was once great and 
real and alive is now dead and decayed. But it also suggests that there is still nothing next to 
remains. This second reading foresees a darker fate for the great things that have come to pass. 
And yet, Shelley’s pun forces the reader to deal with the paradoxical meaning of “remains,” -- 
something that at once survives duration, yet bears the marks of greatness laid waste. In a similar 
vein, Tarkovsky draws our attention to “saba,” the rustiness and cham of the olden days, the 
stamp of time. “Saba,” he writes, “embodies the link between art and nature.”5 
This link can be suggested and, in some ways, composed, on the editing table where the 
joining of two images produces a third, larger meaning; however, editing is not solely, or even 
primarily, responsible for the director’s individual technique of sculpting in time. In response to 
Eisenstein, Tarkovsky writes, “juxtaposing a person with an environment that is boundless, 
collating him with a countless number of people passing by close to him and far away, relating a 
person to the whole world: that is the meaning of cinema.”6 Here, we call to mind Malick’s and 
Lubezki’s astonishing ability to isolate their subject in a crowded frame. By using a wide-angle 
lens and still composing close-ups, Malick and Lubezki create a strong emotional connection 
between audience and subject while still, in the same frame, isolating that in their own 
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environment. In the closest and most intimate relationship that a shot could give us with a 
character -- a closeup of his/her face -- the character is still a stronger in his/her own home. In the 
picture below,7 we can see Rick’s wistful isolation, while the background of the frame is 
crowded with people. These people are not relegated to visual redundancies, as is often in the 
case when backgrounds are obscured, but rather underline how detached Rick is from other 
people who occupy the same space as he does.
Similarly, Knight of Cups returns to a shot of Rick driving his convertible down an empty 
road. A single car on a single highway. These shots, which occur near the beginning and the end 
of the film, not only visually cue the journey of the pilgrim at the center of the film’s narrative, 
but also demonstrate the capacity for man in the modern world to isolate himself through 
technology and machinery. Speeding through tunnels or past vast expanses of horizon, Rick, 
even when he’s with one of his many lovers, is oblivious to and cut off from the natural and 
simulated world around him. He pays the same paltry amount of care to steely metropolis as to 
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the sublime vista. It is ironic, too, that his car, without windows or roof seperating him from his 
environment, is still a vehicle for isolation, a product of the industrial dehumanization of the 
modern man. These shots, too, are a visual reference to Tarkovsky’s Solaris, which features an 
extended, nearly seven-minute long shot of a car traversing the winding highways and 
overpasses of the city. Malick’s use of this shot -- called “the phantom ride” by Mark Cousins, 
among others -- reflects his use of shot in The Tree of Life where it serves as an introduction to 
the modern world and the isolation of Jack within it. In both films, Malick favors the time lapse 
for these shots, heightening the distortion of time which makes a man’s realization of being 
nearly impossible. Tarkovsky will tell us that, “the distortion of time can be a means of giving it 
rhythmical expression.”8 With that in mind, Malick’s rare use of the time lapse warrants 
comment, especially against the backdrop of films whose editing pattern is quick, even if its 
narrative is slow or only seems so. 
If film involves sculpting in time, rhythm is the movement of time. While Tarkovsky 
concedes that “montage cinema” “brings together two concepts and thus engenders a new, third 
one,” he also holds that “the assembly of the shots is responsible for the structure of a film, it 
does not, as is generally assumed, create its rhythm. The distinctive time running through the 
shots makes the rythm of the picture; and rhythm is determined not by the length of the edited 
pieces, but by the pressure of the time that runs through them. Editing cannot determine 
rhythm.”9 Rather, rhythm is determined by “time-pressure.”10 The time lapse in Tree and Knight 
alter the “time-pressure” and so, the rhythm, of these two films, films for which the experience 
and manipulation of time are paramount. 
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Another way to discuss Malick’s meditations on time is by comparison to Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Both Harold Bloom and Georges Poulet give distinct accounts of time in the work of 
Emerson. In Bloom’s The Daemon Knows: Literary Greatness and the American Sublime, 
Bloom focuses his own collection of the American canon and each literary giant’s relationship 
reach towards literary greatness through sheer ambition. For each of the authors examined in his 
volume, Bloom admires the reach for the sublime as an “effort to transcend the human without 
forsaking humanism.”11 His brief mention of transcendence in its relationship to the sublime 
calls to mind the differences between Kant’s and Schopenhaur’s accounts of aesthetic 
experience, particularly how transcendence relates to the sublime. 
The key to Kant’s ideas about nature and aesthetic experience can be found in his 
emphasis on purposiveness. For Kant, because of the a priori and empirical laws of nature which 
can be discerned by the human observer, we can recognize natural as the result of some 
intelligent design. Because the purposiveness of nature is intelligible to the human observer 
without any direct experience necessary, then, Kant argues, we can understand nature as being 
designed to be understood by us. However, our understanding of nature, then, does not result 
from actual theoretical knowledge, but only from our hypothesis about its purposiveness. 
Likewise, aesthetic judgments about beauty and the sublime involve a purposiveness that 
suggests the beauty of nature is “hospitable to our ends.”12 Our end, though, is not actually 
correctly deem what is beautiful to be beautiful, but rather to stimulate and engage our 
imagination and understanding in a sort of “free play” from which we derive aesthetic pleasure. 
As a result, “beauty is not a property of objects, but a relation between their form and the way 
our cognitive faculties work.”13 Similarly, beautiful art stimulates this aesthetic pleasure, but 
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is most successful when it seems unintentional. Natural beauty is different because it is 
effortless; it knows not how to stimulate our aesthetic faculties, and so it would seem to be 
unintentional, and thus, more aesthetically pleasing to our understanding and imagination. 
Now, because we are “self-organizing” beings,14 Kant will continue to grapple with 
our need to erect aesthetic categories. We must understand the parts in relation to the whole 
based on how the object fulfills the purpose for which it is created. This, then, leads Kant to 
speculate about God’s intention of creating the universe. What was God’s end in mind? Our 
intuitive intellect and our organizing impulse, which constructs concepts, begs for a 
teleological concept for all things. Kant will conclude that the end for nature is human beings  
because we can morally use nature in order to derive our own happiness from understanding 
and imagination. And so, our aesthetic judgments lead to the highest good. 
Schopenhauer, like Kant, will attempt to resituate aesthetic judgment within the realm 
of the subjective, arguing that beauty in nature can best be observed through its effects on the 
subject. The biggest difference between Schopenhauer and Kant, however, is that Kant 
believes we should start with aesthetic judgment while Schopenhauer prioritizes the authority 
of aesthetic experience, “before the subject attempts to formulate judgments about the 
experience.”15 For the artist, this aesthetic experience, which can only truly be understood 
through intuition, can be communicated through artistic expression. But for the non-artist, we 
must form our intuition into concepts and thus lose something through the translation to 
abstraction.
So, we are left with a somewhat-superficial war between objective criteria for the 
experience of nature v. the primacy of the individual subjective experience. The core of this 
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difference is epistemological. For Kantians, the categories and concepts of beauty adhere to 
almost Platonic Ideals, while for the Schopenhauer School, the subjectivity of experience 
channels knowledge into our human intuition. For our sake, we will side with Schopenhauer 
because his methodology walks more closely with phenomenology, while Kant’s strict 
adherence to Platonic Ideals reflects structuralism too closely for our efforts here. Briefly, 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic categories include “The Beautiful,” “The Stimulating,” and “The 
Sublime.” “The Beautiful” arises from natural objects transitioning to a “will-less, tranquil” 
state. Their experience on the subject is immediate and almost effortless. “The Stimulating” 
resists contemplation by stirring the appetite positively or negatively. This could include a 
well-cooked meal, a still-life painting, or pornography. Finally, “The Sublime” contain 
objects so vast and intimidating that they consume the human’s attempts and capacities for 
contemplating or understanding them. Among examples he provides are the starry night sky 
and a long desert landscape, objects which are impossible to contemplate.16 While 
Schopenhauer does allow for some art objects to be sublime, he favors the natural realm for 
such an experience, because the more total the threat of diminishing the human individual, 
the more powerful the experience of the sublime. The subject must turn away from the 
hostility of these objects and, in doing so, experiences a state of elevation. This requires a 
resignation of our ability to understand and imagine. The resignation, the turning away, 
untethers ourselves from our will and thrusts us into will-less contemplation. As opposed to 
the experience of “The Beautiful,” which is characterized by a pleasurable loss of 
consciousness, the experience of “The Sublime” involves a somewhat painful experience of 
two moments of self-consciousness. The experience of “The Sublime” allows one to feel 
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“exaltation” in the liberation of the consciousness from the will.17 It is also worth noting that 
in Schopenhauer’s hierarchy of fine arts, poetry ranks second-from-the-top because of its 
ability to transform abstract Ideals and communicate them through language. Music sits atop 
the pyramid because it bypasses translation altogether and reproduces the experience of the 
Ideal which it would hope to communicate. It avoids conceptualization and so can 
communicate the Ideals in their purest form. 
For Emerson, Bloom writes, the sublime is self-contradictory. Timothy Weiskel will 
posit, “The essential claim of the sublime is that man can, in feeling and in speech, transcend the 
human. What, if anything, lies beyond the human -- God or the gods, the daemon or Nature -- is 
matter for greater disagreement. What, if anything, defines the range of the human is scarcely 
less sure.”18 And so, in Bloom’s estimation, the experience of the sublime requires a belief in 
God and Nature, the God-Man, and the Adam of the New World. Through this formulation, our 
experience with the sublime of nature can be most clearly understood and expressed. Adam’s 
dilemma, being at once rendered powerless in awe of natural beauty and motivated to assert the 
dominion of his rationality over it, echoes in the dilemma of the artist when attempting to 
represent or express the sublime. As a result, “simplistically, the sublime in literature has been 
associated with peak experiences that render a secular version of a theophany: a sense of 
something interfused that transforms a natural moment, landscape, action or countenance.”19 
Experiences of the sublime, for Bloom, are appearances of the divine to the human, events which 
transforms a moment or allows the human to see it again with new eyes.
By focusing on American authors in his book, Bloom emphasizes his belief that America 
favors more drastic sublimities than Europe (we will see what Poulet has to say about that in a 
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short bit). In the tradition of American literature, Bloom sees a trend in which “poems, novels, 
stories, plays matter only if we matter. They give us the blessing of more life, whether or not they 
initiate a time beyond boundaries.”20 The stories that matter reaffirm the human by transcending 
him by searching for moments of theophany, while never losing sight of the human at the core of 
it. “High literature,” he writes, “endeavors to augment that span… that proliferation of 
consciousness by which we go on living and finding our own sense of being.”21 In a paradoxical 
way, losing our sense of humanness through an expression of our perceived dominion over 
nature, by reason, only reaffirms the transcendence of man beyond nature and Immanence, the 
divine presence which encompasses and is made manifest in the material world. 
 In Emerson, Bloom reads a limitlessness to his poetry. This poetry requires a love 
“inexplicable in regard to origins,” and one which, “opens fresh vistas.”22 These fresh vistas can 
be a whole New World or a world seen through new, transformed eyes. Indeed, as Walter Pater 
will assert, romantic poetry, like Emerson’s, adds strangeness to beauty,23 but a strangeness, 
Owen Barfield suggests, that must be rooted in meaning. 
 But, the sublime in Emerson does not emerge from some passive gazing or being 
overtaken with a sense of wonder and awe at Immanence. Instead, 
it is not correlative with wonder; for wonder is our reaction to things which we 
are conscious of not quite understanding, or at any rate of understanding less than 
we had thought. The element of strangeness in beauty has the contrary effect. It 
arises from contact with a different kind of consciousness from our own, different, 
yet not  so remote that we cannot partly share it, as indeed, in such a connection, 
the mere word ‘contact’ implies. Strangeness, in fact, arouses wonder when we do 
not understand; aesthetic imagination when we do.24
In Bloom’s quote, the sublime in nature causes wonder within the human subject that 
experiences this theophany. Wonder does not require a conscious action or an intellectual 
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interpretation, no meditation or context for what is being seen. Therefore, wonder cannot alone 
constitute an experience with the sublime because, as he establishes earlier, such an experience 
must come from that seminal paradox of humbling before Immanence and the assertion of our 
rationality over nature. Strangeness without meaning, style without substance, then eludes a 
conscious understanding, and so, we cannot take part in it; there is no connection or “contact.” 
This is, I believe, where Bloom’s fixation with literary ambition is essential to his understanding 
of the sublime. Merely being taken over by the Immanence present in a sublime moment or 
aesthetic experience constitutes a passive viewing experience. Literary ambition, on the other 
hand, attempts to understand by way of the aesthetic imagination, even if such an attempt is 
obviously futile. 
Likewise, French philosopher Georges Poulet will have a great bit to say about Emerson 
and aesthetic experience, tying it more directly to concerns about time in his book Studies of 
Human Time. Time, for Poulet, consists of parts, of lived moments, not the traditional 
understanding of continuity, which he deems false and which must be done away with. However, 
“when we have destroyed the false continuity of time, we have still not attained the instant; we 
only distinguish the true discontinuity of the temporal life.”25 In order to grasp the instant, we 
must strive for a spiritual unity, a human transcendence, as Poulet sees in the work of Emerson. 
“Spiritual unity,” he writes, “is not in the least temporal. It is a relationship between the lived 
moment and the universal totality. It is an immediate and total representation of the universe that 
is formed in the mind every moment.”26 Poulet’s fascinating and difficult claim about spiritual 
unity accounts for both an experience that obviously must transcend the material, temporal 
world, and one that attempts to unite said world with the spiritual. While we seem, as humans, to 
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be only situated in one particular moment in time, prayer, poetry, or expressions of high art, 
allow us to apprehend the absolute, during which, Poulet argues, we exist, and only truly in these 
ambitions. His account of humans coming into being through time insists on a theory of creation 
which continues to unfold, is not just one event or moment fixed in time, and requires, as the 
existentialists will hold, actions in order to truly be. During these moments of existing (which, it 
cannot be overstated, must not be read as merely being absently, but in moments in which he 
apprehend the absolute), during “each moment in which we exist,” we find “also the moment in 
which, beyond the intuition of our existence and that of nature, we have the intuition of the 
divine immensity: ‘If you are sure of your truth, you ascend now into eternity.”27 So the great 
goal and achievement of Emerson’s work, for Poulet, is the apprehension of those moments 
which require our assertion of the dominion of our rationality over Nature (as Bloom would have 
it), and then a further step to and beyond the truth we hold of our existence, a truth which cannot 
be grasped by reason, but only through the assertion of it and its failure to fully grasp the 
sublime. Our Romantic intuition, then, of both our existence and the existence of Nature grants 
us the knowledge of divine immensity (not what it is, but that it is) and makes us aware of 
Immanence. We now can transcend into eternity, which we finally come to understand, is truly an 
everlasting Now.
In order to fully grasp and unpack how Poulet finishes Bloom’s account of ambition 
paving the path to human transcendence through the assertion of our existence by way of poetry 
and prayer, we must spend some time understanding what Poulet means by “human time.” 
Jumping back a bit, Poulet begins his introduction to Studies in Human Time with this account of 
the Christian of the Middle Ages: “[He] did not have first to discover himself existing in time… 
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To feel that he existed was to feel himself to be: neither changing nor becoming… it was simply 
to feel he was and that he endured… There was no real distinction for him between existence and 
duration. [He] could never cease to be what he really was.”28 For Poulet, duration is the 
continuation of existence, and so existence is not a momentary thing, but one which persists 
through duration. The Christian of the Middle Ages, then, recognized no distinction between 
being and existing. It would not make sense to think of being as an action and existence as some 
sort of passive enduring. Instead, for the Christian of the Middle Ages, existence and everything 
was possessed of “an intrinsic continuity,” by which “they were being created every moment… 
the Creator caused them to be and to endure.”29 Creation was not a one-time event, but a 
continua, renewing process, and thus creation and preservation are an indivisible action. 
Still, “the being of the creature tended always toward nothingness,” but his existence 
required the creature to have “an aptitude for preservation.”30 As Bloom noted earlier in man’s 
striving to grasp the sublime, our Adamic Fall places us on downward spiral towards 
annihilation, towards nothingness, and yet, to be, to exist, to persevere, meant “to tend Godward” 
and to “never to cease to possess one’s aptitude for receiving one’s existence from God.”31 But, 
as our experience, and the experience of every man makes known through intuition, our 
understanding of change introduces a continuity to time and thus divides temporality into 
moments of change, one cause to another effect. For the Middle Ages Christian, “to change was 
to pass from potentiality to actuality… nothing about [this transition] was necessarily temporal… 
Everything should have happened simultaneously and at once.”32 While this is nearly impossible 
to fathom as the Modern Man, we must notice that Poulet’s formation establishes time in being, 
not being in time by merging together “the permanent continuity of substantial form; and the 
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successive continuity of change.”33 Change is not something that happens, but something that is 
happening, and so it is inseparable from being. Being is not stagnant; existence is not endurance. 
Rather, being and existing require an understanding of time that does not move along a one-way 
continuum, but that is always Now. 
 In other words, for the Middle Age Christian, time “was not a mode of duration 
absolutely different from permanence… [but] guided toward completion.”34 This movement 
toward an end imagines a finality of movement that “transcended its materiality.” The body of 
the Middle Age Christian “felt a continuous orientation toward a spiritual perfection.”35 Indeed, 
for Locke, succession of his thoughts could give him the idea of time. Actions, then, brought man 
“close to [his] point of perfection,” and “[his] own completion in time, tended to release itself 
from time.” Among the many prominent forms of artistic expression during the Middle Ages, 
architecture rested upon two principles: “The continuous creation which established the 
permanence of the creature and of his substantial activity; and the divine concourse which 
allowed him to realize himself in time.”36 In the Middle Ages, it was architecture. For the 
Romantic, it will be prayer and poetry. 
 Poulet further argues that after the Middle Ages Christian, “the character of human 
duration changed profoundly.”37 Man no longer considered God to be an otherworldly cause 
which created, and preserved His creatures and continued their existences by his own effort and 
will. Instead, God was seen as “the indwelling power that from within tirelessly sustained and 
prolonged the universal motion by which things and beings accomplished their temporal 
destiny.”38 God was no longer thought of creating permanence, but rather as an Immanent force 
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which sustains the universe “only in its becoming.”39 This process is “guided by a cyclical 
development, a force everywhere the same and perpetually diversified” aka “daemons.”40 
 As a result, Poulet says, Man gained a “joy of being in time” because temporality no 
longer served as a reminder of our impending mortality. Rather, it provided us with a “theatre 
and a field of action”41 through which man could explore divinity and attain a personal 
immortality despite his own mortality. In other words, this new understanding of a God which 
does not sustain permanence fortified the importance of Man’s own effort to create his own 
becoming and establish his own permanence through prayer and poetry. Such grand artistic 
efforts sought the divine immanence in nature and in man which has seemed to separate itself 
from its origin. Thus, “the once-immanent creative activity had become transcendent.” It’s goal, 
to “maintain the creature in its existence.”42
 However, for Luther and Calvin, original sin had robbed Man from the right of 
participating in the creative act, and no effort at his own preservation through artistic expression 
could change that. No effort to assert his existence through the creative act could reestablish Man 
from his fallen state into a state of being with true nature and true duration. But, for the 
redeemed, duration is eternal, and in the particular moment of redemption, the act of creation (or 
creative effort) is “joined to an eternal moment.”43 In other words, creative expression on behalf 
of the fallen man revises Descartes famous assertion of his own existence. Instead of cogito ergo 
sum, credo ergo sum. Through an act of faith, and this can be a creative one, the fallen man can 
attempt to redeem himself from the finality of mortality and reestablish his connection with the 
divine. For the Romantic, “human consciousness finds itself reduced to Existence without 
duration. It is always of the present moment,”44 and that is a moment of pure intuition, not a 
43
rationalist cogito. For the Romantic, “Existence and duration are no longer identical. To exist 
does not necessarily mean to endure. It is necessary to pass from one to the other, and this 
passage is no less difficult to conceive than the relationship of the spirit to the body or the 
transmission of motion in the universe.”45 
 Through Poulet’s charting of the Middle Ages Christian to his Fall to his attempt at 
redemption as a Romantic Man, we can see the typical arc of a Malickian protagonist, as most 
clearly expressed recently through his Rick (Christian Bale) in Knight of Cups. Near the 
beginning of Malick’s odyssey through modern L.A., a voice-over by Ben Kingsley recites this 
passage from The Pilgrim’s Progress by John Bunyan.
Once the soul was perfect and had wings and could soar into heaven as only 
creatures can. But the soul lost its wings and fell to earth, there it took an earthly 
body, and now while it lives in this body no outward sign of wings can be seen, 
yet the roots of its wings are still there and the nature of these is to try  to raise the 
earthbound soul into heaven. When you see a beautiful woman or a man, the soul 
remembers the beauty  it used to know in heaven and the wings begin to sprout 
and makes the soul want to fly but it cannot yet, the man is still too weak, so the 
man keeps staring at the sky like a young bird. He has lost all interest in the world 
around him.46
A Christian allegory from 1678, Bunyan’s novel depicts the journey of the Christian man through 
the temptation of the secular world to salvation in heaven with Christ. Its characters are each 
archetypical, taking names like “Christian,” “Talkative,” “Faithful,” “Help,” etc.47 The form and 
narrative of Knight of Cups borrows heavily from Bunyan’s tale, using it as a sort of blueprint 
and casting the above quote as a sort of epigram for the film. Malick also borrows from 
Augustine’s Confessions and Dante’s Divine Comedy in his construction of Knight of Cups. It is 
essential to note, however, that Malick, unafraid of placing his films in decades past, unfolds 
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Knight of Cups in the present, updating those classic narratives of spiritual and existential 
journeys for a contemporary art form. 
 Indeed, Malick’s embrace of the modern goes further than his use of present-day as a 
setting for his most recent films. An auteur whose visual style is indistinguishable from the 
contributions of Lubezki, Malick frequently employs the use of very low-grade, consumer-level 
HD cameras and GoPros throughout Knight of Cups. Lubezki’s wide-angle shots, wide 
compositions, wandering camera, and use of natural light still dominate a majority of the film, 
but standing in stark contrast to Malick’s choice to employ these consumer-grade cameras for 
certain scenes, warrants mentioning. 
But not everyone shares my enthusiasm for Malick’s spiritual digressions and aesthetic 
experiments. Patterson wrote, “Malick has been drifting away from me for a while now… 
[Knight is] everything Malick’s detractors loathe: pictorially incontinent or annoyingly gorgeous, 
throttled by voiceover, and quite the 118-minute slog,”48 while admitting, 
the pleasures are myriad. Chivo working at a fever pitch of pictorial ecstasy in his 
outings with Malick. There are the architectural cliches freshly revitalised -- the 
exterior elevators at  the Bonaventure Hotel and the hilltop  glass box of the Stahl 
House -- but there are also lesser-known pleasures, such as the tunnel from the 
I-10 freeway onto the Pacific Coast Highway, which can feel like an ascent into 
heaven, just as the movie uses it.49 
Peter Bradshaw of The Guardian commented, “There are moments of visual brilliance 
here, moments of reverence and even grandeur. But his style is stagnating into mannerism, 
cliche, and self-parody.”50 Bradshaw appreciated the application of “transcendent visual 
language to evoke heartland America” in Malick’s To the Wonder, but found these same 
techniques to be now “tiresome” in L.A., constituting what he calls, “pedantic”, and the “least 
interesting spiritual crisis in history.”51 What Bradshaw misses here is the suggestion of inter-
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textuality between Malick’s films. Malick wants you to recall the gorgeous shots with the camera 
gazing heavenward up the enormous truck of a giant and ancient tree in search of some sublime 
and transcendent beauty. That same camera move, that same gaze now desperately searches for 
meaning in the steel-and-glass plated skyscrapers. Green is replaced with silver, nature with 
modern architecture. Several shots inside Rick’s speeding car watch a horizon and an empty L.A. 
street flash by in a blur. A similar time-lapse of traffic coursing through a lifeless city was used in 
The Tree of Life to suggest the spiritual alienation of Jack (Sean Penn) in that film. If Malick’s 
visual cues, style, and grammar seem tired, fine, but the viewer’s recognition that he/she has seen 
some of it before is essential to his effort. 
In a brilliant essay for Curator Magazine, Trevor Logan notes extensives the 
Kierkegaardian influences52 on Malick’s recent work, namely in the quest of spiritual redemption 
in the secular world. He astutely observes that Knight of Cups was marketed as “a quest,” and so 
all of the wandering through the vacant city streets and the climbing through the barren desert 
serve as visual metaphors for the arduous climb out of damnation and into salvation. One of 
Logan’s better finds is this line from Augustine: “Think of the burden of Christ as being like the 
burden of wings for birds. As long as a bird is burdened by wings, it can fly. Without wings, it is 
trapped on earth. The wings carrying us to Christ are the commandments to love God above all 
and our neighbor as ourself. To the extent that you use these wings, you will lift up your heart.”53 
For Augustine, love is necessary to grow the wings and to fly toward the infinite, attempting the 
ascendence from the tethers of the human condition to the transcendent through the creative act, 
the precise process by which Poulet promised man could escape duration and discover being. 
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Now, Logan will also shine an important light on repetition54 in Malick’s films. Logan 
writes, “To make the movement of repetition is synonymous with the movement of faith.”55 He 
expects this to serve as an explanation of what he calls “double-takes”56 in both To the Wonder 
and Knight of Cups, but this quick claim goes underdeveloped. Logan relies on Plato’s 
explanation of our flight from the cave to demonstrate that repetition begins with recollection, or 
that, Wittgenstein writes, “what is incomprehensible is that nothing, and yet everything, has 
changed,”57 or as Proust would say, “The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new 
landscapes but in seeing with new eyes.”58 In recollection, in the act of memory, we become 
conscious of our lost world, of a past that has passed, of a paradise lost. But, repetition, and thus, 
faith, regains the transformed old world and heals the soul of anxiety and alienation. Logan will 
tell us that it is Malick’s quest to “get us to fall in love with repetition,” or as Kierkegaard writes, 
“the love of repetition is in truth the only happy love” because it “connects the temporal with the 
eternal.”60 We again hear echoes of Poulet’s description of the journey of man from the Middle 
Ages into the Romantic Era.
But not all viewers had the same deeply philosophical experience. Bradshaw finds the 
characters narratively disposable, but beautiful, and notes that the robbery scene is observed in 
the same “woozy, dreamy, flashback pace as the rest of the movie and is thus hardly noticed.”61 
His viewing never slipped into the sense of rhythm that Malick establishes. Ultimately, he 
concludes that “the mythological and spiritual resonance of everything that we see is entirely 
unearned.”62 Interestingly enough, Bradshaw does take time to remark that Malick’s continual 
return to shots of the desert -- a visual motif present and relevant in The Tree of Life -- can be 
chalked up to “ruins-porn.”63
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 Richard Brody, on the other hand, defends Malick as one of the few contemporary 
filmmakers who remains honest about his experience. He calls Knight of Cups, “a confessional, 
the Dantesque midlife-crisis drama, the religious quest, the romantic struggle, the sexual reverie, 
the family melodrama,” and remarks that “perhaps no film in the history of cinema follows the 
movement of memory as faithfully, as passionately, or as profoundly.”64 In defense of the film’s 
picaresque, wandering structure, Brody explains that the “Protagonist’s life, like most people’s 
lives, involves intertwined strands of activity that don’t just overlap but are inseparable from 
each other.”65 The film, we writes, is intimate in focus, but epic in scope. Brody is correct to 
identify how the film’s reliance on memory punctuates its “ecstatic power of its images and 
sounds.”66 He finds it confessional, intimate, almost private in its semi-autobiographical vein. 
 Beginning with a voice-over about a story in search of a treasure, the rest of the film 
unfolds in a series of episodes, incidents, impressions, and experiences, sometimes repetitive, 
sometimes referential, sometimes elliptical in nature. Where some see a structural mess, Brody 
sees a “vision of the modern world, the world of inescapable images and of their dubious 
demiurges.”67 Rather than decrying the film’s anti-narrative thrust, Brody celebrates that
One of the movie’s majestic paradoxes that his desire to make himself whole 
involves not an artificial synthesis from the start but the acceptance of fragments 
-- of incidents, experience, episodes, impressions -- from which their own 
unifying principle will arise. Knight of Cups is Rick’s act of remembering, and it 
follows the strange double logic of memory -- the triggering efforts of willful 
thought and the free-flowing associations of the unconscious mind.68 
Indeed, as Brody and others have identified, the title is a reference a Tarot card, which serves as 
the organizing logic of the story. It is a “metaphor to fleeting moments, to visions and sounds that 
bring pieces of Rick’s latter-day life rushing ahead with an irrepressible energy.”69 Told in eight 
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parts separated by a title card, Knight of Cups contains episodes which bear the titles “The 
Moon,” “The Hanged Man,” “The Hermit,” “Judgment,” “The Tower,” “The High Priestess,” 
“Death,” and “Freedom,” each an allusion to a specific Tarot card. However, one must wonder 
what Malick hopes to achieve or suggest by melding a Christian allegory with Tarot cards to 
form the structure of his modern-day, and semi-autobiographical spiritual journey, one that ends 
in progress rather than despair. Rather than a lazy organizational technique, this fusion of 
multiple spiritual epistemologies through which the viewer can help to construct meaning. 
Malick seems to suggest that any spiritual mode of understanding is better than none at all, and 
amidst the excess and emptiness of the hedonism on display, Rick and the viewer are joined in 
the journey of “spontaneous inner creation at the core of the film.”70 
Like the juxtaposition of Tarot cards and Christian spirituality, the visual representation 
of objects in the film oscillates between “The Beautiful,” “The Stimulating,” and “The Sublime.” 
We are given settings that vary from the limitless luxury of a Versailles-like L.A. mansion to the 
natural paradise of the beach and ocean to finally an uninhabited wasteland, a cracked desert that 
resembles a fiery inferno in the darkness on the edge of town. We find this the placement of “The 
Stimulating” next to “The Beautiful” and “The Sublime” in Malick’s visual grammar -- the 
aforementioned low-res, consumer-grade footage set next to the work of a modern 
cinematographic legend -- as well as in his casting. Like nearly all of his films, Knight of Cups 
features a litany of impossibly-beautiful people. Sure, it’s L.A., and everyone looks like that, but 
the exterior beauty of the characters pressed against the vacuousness of their words, their 
character, and their interior lives reveals a deep spiritual chasm. In To The Wonder, Malick will 
make a similar move, casting Ben Affleck, Olga Kurylenko, Javier Bardem, and Rachel 
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McAdams and placing them often alongside very earthy-looking locals. The juxtaposition 
mirrors the juxtaposition of the basic, pastoral quality of the Midwestern settings next to the 
episodes in France. Many characters do not even warrant names, or simply borrow the first 
names of the men and women who play them. For the first time in a Malick film, recognizable 
faces people the background as extras, faces at once recognizable and hardly distinguishable 
from the party crowd. There is a sexual pleasure tied to the visual pleasure, one which the viewer 
must feel in order to experience the confessional spiritual journey and redemption that Rick goes 
through. But pleasure can be temporary if it is not rooted in joy. For Malick, much of the 
realization, the spiritual awakening that goes into a character’s redemption comes from the joy of 
seeing with new eyes. For a deeper exploration of this representation of subjectivity and the 
experience with The Sublime as it relates to time, we must turn over to our exploration of 
memory in Malick’s films.
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Chapter 3: Memory as Intra-textual
 As Tarkovsky as stated, memory is inseparable from time, and so to discuss time without 
transitioning immediately to memory in a discussion of a phenomenological approach to 
Malick’s films would be a gross disservice and an oversight. Indeed, as Brody writes, 
The crucial question of the modern novel is memory -- specifically, the tension 
between fiction and nonfiction, between the sharp-edged exclusivity of the 
contours of a finely crafted story and the loose-ended and associatively 
meandering and indeterminate formlessness of experience as captured (or 
trapped) in memory. That’s why the grand landmarks of literary modernity  -- such 
as those of Proust, Joyce, Woolf, Bellow, Hemingway, Faulkner, Duras, and the 
Roths -- are simultaneously  struggles with the irrepressible profusion of memory 
and the hotly forged imperatives of style and idealizing abstractions of form. 
Hardly the first to employ extensive use of flashbacks or a prominent focus on memory, Malick’s 
technique regarding the act of remembering and the experience of involuntary memory separates 
him from his contemporaries and requires an exploration of the link between time and memory 
as expressed in Tarkovsky -- as an element of a director’s personality -- and in Bergson -- as an 
essential part of the creative act.1 But, for the purposes of this discussion, let’s begin with 
Proust’s conceptions of voluntary vs. involuntary memory.2 In short, voluntary memory refers to 
the conscious act of remembering, that brain operation we perform when someone asks, “Hey, 
remember when...?” or when we choose to look back on a particularly traumatic or joyous time. 
Involuntary memory seizes us. It is evoked frequently by our sensory experience of the natural 
world and forges associations between objects and events in time that we might otherwise not 
form consciously. Involuntary memory dictated the structure of Proust’s longeuers in A la 
reserche du temps perdu and has remained the subject for many artists since. For Malick, both 
voluntary and involuntary memory inform his narrative structure. Characters can, through voice-
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over, trigger shifts in narrative inside their own films, or become seized by involuntary memory 
through their own sensory experience of the natural world, in which case, the narrator of the film 
bestows this involuntary memory upon them. 
 Furthermore, Malick’s evocative and impressionistic imagery conjures involuntary 
memory for the viewer, too, in two substantial ways. First, his almost archetypical images force 
the viewer to recall similar seminal moments in his/her own life, the rich reservoir of imagery 
from which Malick pulls and pulls again erects an inter- and intra-textuality within his own 
films, further expanding their power as creative actions. Still, the evocation of memory in cinema 
cannot be separated from our experience of time, at least as it relates to Malick, who constructs 
an associative memory within his subject through the use of editing and rhythm. Let’s turn back 
to Tarkovsky for our theoretical framework: “How does time make itself felt in a shot? It 
becomes tangible when you sense something significant, truthful, going on beyond the events on 
the screen; when you realize, quite consciously, that what you see in the frame is not limited to 
its visual depiction, but as a pointer to something stretching out beyond the frame and to 
infinity.”3 In Tarkovsky’s formation, time is not felt merely through duration, but in relationship 
to what is seen in the frame and what is gestured to outside of it. So, Malick’s association of 
prayers or objects or sounds as triggers for memory can gesture outside of the frame, outside of 
the scene itself, and transcend the linear timeline of the film. Still, we are bound, or confined, by 
the inescapable reality that “binding and immutable conditions of cinema is that actions on the 
screen have to develop sequentially, regardless of the fact of being conceived as simultaneous or 
retrospective or what have you.”4 However, while actions must progress sequentially and invoke 
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some sense of cause and effect, the editing and rhythm of these sequences can be reordered to 
power effect suggesting that memory is our ever-present past. 
 If, for Poulet, creation for the Romantic lies in intuition, then is memory creative? 
Through intuition, the Romantic is “unable to perceive anything else.”5 Instead, he is forced into 
“total dependence on a creation continually reiterated” through the creative act which hopes to 
give birth to “the unity of the soul.”6 Through the creative act, the Romantic man can experience 
the joy that accompanies the actual existence of being what one truly is. Through joy, man can 
experience the lived sensation which is the consciousness of being. This experience of being, as 
Pascal would describe, is “neither fixed state nor wholeness… Thus the soul attached to God 
constantly feels its dependence and knows that the righteousness which is given it never subsists 
by itself but is created within it by God from moment to moment.”7
Poulet rehearses Le Roy who suggests that “in order to be happy we have either 
constantly to change our sensory environment or to carry to excess sensations of the same type.”8 
This suggests an anxiety brought about by consciousness, a certain restlessness which could give 
rise to the ambitious grasp towards the transcendent and the sublime, one that must be expressed 
either through prayer or through art. The result resembles a reservoir of affect which is always in 
danger of being “destroyed by their very enjoyment but at the same time exacerbated by 
memory”9 which, in a sense, grants them infinity. The desire for the expression of excess comes 
from the joy of the intensity of the moment of feeling. However, excess uncovers the awareness 
of this feeling of joy, which can immediately pull the human subject out of the experience and 
into a conscious interpretation of it, a crippling awareness. Poulet suggests that “each new 
moment of awareness reveals two distinct features: not only the new sensation which is the 
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kernel of the moment, but also the ensemble of sensations already lived, whose resonances 
prolong themselves within it and surround it with their nebula.”10 But he goes silent on the 
vividness of this ensemble of sensations. In other words, do memories already lived suffice? In 
the Christian sense, memory or remembering involves the experience of time as kairos, 
something happening in a fixed moment in the past which continues to happen throughout the 
rest of our existence. For the Catholic, each remembrance of the Last Supper during the 
celebration of Mass both calls to mind the past sacrifice of Christ and makes it present in this 
moment. Here lies the phenomenon of memory: “By remembering, man escapes the purely 
momentary; by remembering, he escapes the nothingness that lies in wait for him between 
moments of existence.”11 But, at the same time, by remembering, he takes part in the recreative 
act of a past moment which has the power to do away with the morality of temporality and gives 
way to permanent perseverance from God.
Affective memory, Poulet will insist “is no less authentic an existence than the existence 
of the moment. It is as if to exist meant to live two lives at the same time: the life lived day by 
day; and the life lived before and beyond the day or the moment: a life which lengthens into 
duration.”12 However, as previously mentioned, consciousness suppresses feelings of duration by 
calling to mind our own temporality, our own mortality. The acknowledgment of the looming 
abyss points to permanence. In Poulet’s words, “What kills us is having to support the weight of 
the future in the void of present.”13 However, I wonder if the way to fill this void, to bridge this 
infinite gulf is to give in to the re-happening of the event recalled in our memory. Do feelings 
about a particular moment change in memory? If so, then by reliving a memory in the act of 
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remembrance we do recreate a different moment, an almost alternative timeline. This might hold 
the clue to bridging human time and cosmic time.
This bridging of time is essential to Malick’s work, but in order to fully understand how 
Malick’s editing and rhythm evoke creative memory, we must distinguish between what I will 
call “associative editing” and what is traditionally understood as “montage editing.” Tarkovsky 
writes, “the principles of ‘montage cinema’ do not alllow the film to continue beyond the edges 
of the screen: they do not allow the audince to bring personal experiences to bear on what is in 
front of them on film. ‘Montage cinema’ presents the audeince with puzzles and riddles, makes 
them decipher symbols, take pleasure in allegories, appealing all the time to their intellectual 
experience.” 14 For Tarkovsky, montage editing is too structuralist, too fixed. The solution to the 
puzzle is already determined, and so, while the two images placed together can create the third 
meaning, what exactly that third meaning is is not free to subjective interpretation or 
imagination, two keys to our phenomenological understanding of Malick’s films. How, then, 
does associative editing work?
First, Malick’s use of associative editing establishes its foundations in his voice-over 
narration. In The Tree of Life, Jack’s prayers above are answered by the narrative. For example, 
when reflecting on her son’s death, Mrs. O’Brien asks “Where were you? Did you know?” God’s 
response is to shift the narrative from present-day back to a twenty-minute montage of the 
creation of the universe, the first breaths of life on earth, and the first sin. This narrative gesture 
completes the epigram on the title card at the beginning of the film, a quote from the Book of 
Job, which reads: “Where were you when I laid the foundations of the Earth? When the morning 
stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy?”15 Opening a film this way prepares 
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the viewer for a modern-day Job allegory, which The Tree of Life is not. However, it establishes 
the narrative direction of the film as prayer-and-answer. The character’s voice-overs are 
frequently questions directed to God, unanswered only by the narrative. Their journeys, their 
joys, and their frustrations are spiritual. Young Jack’s questions, “Where were you? You let a boy 
die,” and “Why should I be good when you aren’t?” are echoed in his mother’s pleas for 
theodicy and in his grown-up self’s inability to understand the meaninglessness of his brother’s 
apparent suicide. More than any other of his films, The Tree of Life is Malick’s dialogue with 
God. It opens with Jack -- who we can assume is Malick’s semi-autobiographical stand-in -- 
whispering “Brother. Mother. It was they who led me to your door.” Near the end, he says, 
“Brother. Guide us to the end of time.” Mrs. O’Brien’s journey is similar to Jack’s, questioning 
God’s reasons and finally resolving, in a life after death, that she “gave him to you.” 
But aside from informing the narrative of The Tree of Life, associative editing works a lot 
like Proust’s involuntary memory. After the much-criticized “creation of the world” sequence, 
Malick brings creation to a very personal, individual, intimate scope. The creation of the world is 
shown culminating in the birth of Jack. Like his utterance in The Thin Red Line, the merging of 
the cosmic and the intimate suggests we are all faces of the same man. Malick visualizes birth as 
children dressed in white, being handed candles before swimming out of an under-water house 
and emerging from their mother’s womb in a bleached-white hospital. This image, of people 
suspended in water, swimming up, will recur in Knight of Cups, be will be reappropriated as a 
sort of Babel-esque search for transcendental meaning. But, perhaps, this difference is not as vast 
as it first seems. Perhaps, in Knight the search for meaning consists of a series of rebirths, a 
creative action which never ceases and always repeats. 
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After the birth sequence, we are treated to a montage of familiar moments and events, 
visuals which evoke the shared experience that most of the average viewer can relate to. We see 
Jack’s first steps; Jack learn the alphabet; strange relatives that step in and out of our lives; our 
first trangressions; the birth of a younger sibling and the Oedipal jealousy it engenders; Jack’s 
first steps; lessons from our mothers; playing with the neighbor kids; Halloween; grandma; our 
first lesson about God; the first time we see illness (a man having a seizure) that bears no context  
for us but trauma; the first time we see physical deformity, which draws our impolite gaze; our 
first crushes; etc. This sequence, set to gorgeous classical music, bears little plot relevance. The 
goal, the telos, is not clear, but it flows through us like a scrapbook, snapshots of memorable 
moments devoid of obvious purpose and context. This, perhaps, is the power of Malick’s editing 
style. His flashbacks do not always provide essential information for whatever it is he assumes 
constitutes plot in his films. Rather, the rationale for his flashbacks, his memories, are emotional 
and spiritual. They contain meaning which insists on itself, but is not altogether rationally clear. 
The difference between these two types of memory -- the one motivated by narrative and 
the one that appears as a series of flashbacks from the main character’s experience -- can be 
categorized by Bergson’s containers, imagining vs. repeating.17 By uniting both in The Tree of 
Life, Malick makes the Poulet-ian move of uniting the immanent man with transcendence 
through the act of creation and so through the transcendence from linear time. In other words, 
prayer, like poetry, through the act of doing, imagines the past and makes it present, linking the 
individual human subject across time. Memory can be invoked through imagining or repeating. 
When an event, a line, a gesture, is repeated, it can spur the creative imagination to recollect 
things passed, and so recreate them in the present. This action is essential for Poulet’s, 
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Kirkegaard’s, and Malick’s effort for man to transcend his condition. In doing so, he realizes that 
the end is the beginning -- as revealed in the cyclical stylings of the narrative in The Tree of Life 
and Knight of Cups -- and that the journey is the destination, that the pilgrim is always arriving. 
As Poulet will have it, this journey is different from endurance because it is not stagnant but 
requires the realization that all time is Now. 
Likewise, the narrative structure of To the Wonder and Knight of Cups disrupts 
convention for the sake of performing the inner meaning of Malick’s ideas about the intersection 
of time and memory. Both films dispose of the traditional three-act structure that has become 
commonplace for film and which trains and forms the expectation of the viewing audience. 
Succinctly, this structure introduces the audience to a protagonist -- the main character whose 
journey it is throughout the film to achieve his/her goal -- and the antagonist -- the character 
whose role it is to foil and obstruct the goal of the protagonist. About 10-12 minutes into a two-
hour film, the “inciting incident” occurs, which Paul Auster calls, “the mistake that sets the story 
in motion.” Around 28-32 minutes, the plot turns to form and resolve some “B-story.” The 
“midpoint,” or the “point-of-no-return” must be a point of high drama, while the end of the 
second act (around 90 minutes into a two-hour film) puts our protagonist in his/her most 
vulnerable and dire position. Finally, a rousing climax resolves the primary conflict at the very 
end of the film. At this point in the paper, it should go without saying that Malick has long since 
abandoned this structure. Indeed, his first film, Badlands, follows the vague sketches of this 
structure, and I would suppose that is not an insignicant factor in why many Malick-detractors 
find that to be his last tolerable film. Additionally, others have found his films to be unwatchable, 
a mess, meandering, etc., in no small part due to their unconventional narrative structure. Akin to 
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aesthetic expectations, when our narrative expectations are met, we experience a feeling of 
pleasure. Traditions of stories with similar narrative structure have conditioned the audience to 
expect the pacing of a film and other major pieces to be in place. When they are reordered and 
substituted for other structures and styles, the audience can experience an unpleasurable 
upsetting of its expectations and so be turned off to the film in front of them, even more, deem it 
a failure at its own enterprise. But here again, I believe holding Malick’s narrative structure up to 
the stencil of other dramatic films merely because they both can be classified within the same 
medium, is not only a disservice to, but a misunderstanding of the inner meaning of the film. The 
style and technique must support then content and conscience at the center of cinematic 
expression.
Roger Ebert, in his final filed film review before his death, will ask this question. “Why 
must a film explain everything?” he asks, “Why must every motivation be spelled out? Aren’t 
many films fundamentally the same film, with only the specifics changed? Aren’t many of them 
telling the same story?”18 In a soft condemnation of the critical dismissal of To the Wonder, Ebert 
continues, “There will be many who find To the Wonder elusive and too effervescent. They’ll be 
dissatisfied by a film that would rather evoke than supply. I understand that, and I think Terrence 
Malick does, too. But here he has attempted to reach more deeply than that: to reach beneath the 
surface, and find the soul in need.”19 What Ebert asks here is what Malick asks of his audience: 
to adjust its expectations and aesthetic judgment. For a film to seek to evoke rather than supply is 
to fulfill Tarkovsky’s goal when he rejects montage cinema. Malick, like Tarkovsky, asks the 
audience to bring its personal experiences into the film, and both filmmakers invite the audience, 
by constructing narratives, aesthetics, and rhythm that reach beyond the limits of the frame, to 
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become a symbol that reaches beyond itself, accepting a multitide of interpretations, and 
becoming itself an instance of what it represents, rather than merely being a sign with one fixed 
significance. 
Malick’s techniques and styles that support this ambitous goal include his free-wheeling, 
seemingly-improvised cinematography, his heavy use of voice-over, the dominance of classical 
music on his soundtrack, and, what Ebert will call, his “repertory of fundamental images he 
draws upon.”20 These images include vast expanses of landscape across a horizon, a setting sun, 
shadows cast a magic hour, hands gracing tall grass, women in gowns twirling, lovers making 
play with their hands, children inside running over furniture, the camera gaze up a giant tree, the 
tide coming in on the shore, the people who walk it barefoot, a wanderer ascending a daunting 
staircase, people lying down and rolling, dogs, women objectified, etc. The critic might be right 
to call these images repetitive, to say Malick makes and remakes the same film, because this is 
part of the point. Bradshaw decries that Malick’s imagery and technique, as beautiful as they 
both may be, are tired by the time Knight of Cups is released. But he misses important variations 
in their presentation and the point of repetition. 
Repetition, whether through the reservoir of images Malick draws from in his films, or in 
their circular narrative structure creates relationships between and among his films, placing them 
in conversation, gestures toward the evocative, almost archetypical power of his images, and 
highlights the existential idea that man becomes through repetition. In Knight of Cups, Rick 
shares episodes with at least six different women, hard to distinguish after a casual first watch, 
and each of them tells him nearly the same thing -- “love and do what you like,” “you don’t want 
love; you want a love experience,” “grab a hold of life, take chances,” “in love with the world, in 
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love with love,” etc. One character even reminds him “don’t go back to being dead,” as though 
life itself is a cosmic cycle of death and rebirth, of stagnation and becoming. In addition, we see 
repeating images of planes or helicopters in the sky. Like the shots of birds and bats soaring in 
The Tree of Life, these images represent the character’s internal desire for escape and for 
transcendence, to regrow the wings of an angel and to soar back into heaven. But, by recalling 
the images of birds and bats and transforming them into mechanized vehicles for flight, Malick 
wants us to carry the soul’s yearning into the modern world, where our spiritual expressions, too, 
are rooted in a technological imagination. Memories are shot on low-grade digital cameras, and 
the shots of whirring traffic find life Rick’s passage through busy L.A., surrounded by people, 
yet never connecting to one. The expression of Malick’s themes in the modern-world setting 
underline the isolating and vapid desolation of simulated reality. Among the many settings Rick 
wanders is a film set, a vacant, faux city, which, in many ways L.A., itself, is. 
Characters are fraught with isolation by their archectural surroundings. In Knight of Cups, 
Rick ascends on an elevator twice, but, of course, like the Tower of Babel, an elevator his its 
limits and cannot soar into the heavens. We see a similar representation of transcending through 
ascending, and the necessary, later descending in The Tree of Life, again mitigated by the glass 
and steel elevator. As Jack travels up a giant skyscraper which now takes the places of the 
undisturbed trees we saw earlier, the camera gazes up at these buildings, too. But instead of 
finding a Romantic sense of self as he does in the natural world, the steel skyscrapers isolate 
Jack. When he ascends the building, presumably for some meeting, he sits and gazes at the floor 
in recollection, the volume of the other characters’ voices fades out, and we see the figures of 
bodies through frosted glass, like shadows on a cave wall. But, it is in the ascendent place, so 
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close to heaven, but not quite there, that Jack can transcend the stagnation of his moment and 
create the past in the present through the act of imaginative memory. At the end of the film, this 
knowledge gained through remembering allows Jack to return to the isolation and alienation of 
the modern world and continue his spiritual search for meaning among the steel topiary, a 
journey that is continued in Knight of Cups.
To a less prominent, but equally important effect, modern architecture isolates Neil (Ben 
Affleck) and Marina (Olga Kurylenko) in To the Wonder. In one of the more brilliant and 
impressionistic shots in the film, Neil and Marina, in the aftermath of a brutal marital quarrel, are 
unable to connect, separated by storeys in their home.21 
Their blocking and body language suggest a non-verbal communication, and the set design 
provides a path for Neil to find Marina, but the layout of the house visualizes the separation of 
these two as a result of their domestic arrangement, a separation which will soon cross 
continents. They could be ghosts wandering the same house separated by time. This set design 
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stands in stark contrast to earlier sequences in the film which are set outside rear old ruins.22 Neil 
and Marina fall in love against the backdrop of the vast, sublime expanses of landscape Malick 
loves, the same sort of landscapes that drew together Kit and Holly in Badlands, Bill and Abby 
in Days of Heaven, John Smith and Pocahantas in The New World. Nature provides the setting of 
love for the Romantic by situating them among the “saba,”23 the merging of art and nature. It is 
this merging that makes it possible for man to realize his being through memory.
 During The Tree of Life, the setting provides visual cues for the audience’s memory, as 
well. Jack’s home as an adult bears a striking resemblance to his home as a child, his Eden, the 
paradise that he loses near the end of the film. Scott says this setting belongs “both to history and 
to memory,”24 creating a link between the two by which history is constituted by memory and 
forms memory at the same time. Not only does this connection suggest to the viewer that Jack, 
even as an adult, has a Rosebud-like connection to his childhood home, but also asks us to read 
Jack as an adult, as a homemaker, as similar to his father. For a film whose narrative suggests 
that the story of each person repeats almost archetypically throughout time, that we are all faces 
of the same man, then Malick’s use of father’s and son’s provides the possibility for redemption 
for the previous generation. It is not incarnation, but each son is a creative remembrance of the 
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father, and indeed, the mother.25 In his Oedipal rebellion as an adolescent, Jack tells his father, 
“You’d like to kill me,” and “It’s your house. You can kick me out whenever you want to.” Mr. 
O’Brien’s failure of a father and an entrepreneur make it possible for him to expect too much and 
to place pressure on his son, an influence that we see Jack cannot escape. 
 Rick struggles to emerge from the same long shadow cast by The Father in Knight of 
Cups. Many have suggested that Knight of Cups continues the semi-autobiographical narrative 
from The Tree of Life. Both white male protagonists embark on a spiritual journey to find a 
means of transcending the ordinary world. Both have brothers who kill themselves. Both have 
overbearing fathers. But Knight of Cups offers a resolution to the father-son relationship, or a 
least a recontextualization of it, that Tree does not. Rick’s disassociation from his father is caused 
by and fuels his contempt for him. Brian Dennehy’s performance as Rick’s father capitalizes on 
the moments of explosive anger we saw in Pitt’s. But Dennehy’s father is tired, a bit more empty, 
further along near the end of his rope. In his eyes we see more miles, more feeling of regret, 
more rage to unleash the world. When we see him working alone in an empty office and then 
wandering across an empty stage, we cannot help by draw the inter-textual reference to Death of 
a Salesman, in which Dennehy so memorably portrayed Willy Loman in 1999. The Father’s rage 
at the cosmos is Lear-esque, or Ahab-ian in his stark confrontation of God, the Sublime, the 
Leviathan. As Rick helps his father up stairs, his father notices “the light’s gone out of your eyes. 
Grab a hold of life! Grab it and hold it. Take chances, my son.” His warnings to his son, that 
Rick not follow down the same road of meaninglessness and regret, the feeling that he could 
have been something great (a sentiment echoed in Pitt’s Mr. O’Brien), culminate in the wisdom 
that “The light in the eyes of others, they guid you on your way.” Rick is told, at the end of the 
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film, to “wake up” and “turn.” This is a spiritual enlightenment, a Pauline conversion, and the 
reward is the pearl mentioned in a story at the beginning of the film. Rick’s salvation means 
salvation for his father, who asks him to “redeem my life; justify it.” A continuation and 
development of a similar theme and relationship in The Tree of Life, this revelation from father to 
son shows the interconnectedness of the human experience and human beings across generations. 
Knight, like Tree, is, “rooted in an idiosyncratic Christianity and also in the Romantic literary 
tradition, the loss of innocence is not a singular event in history but rather an axiom of human 
experience, repeated in every generation and in the consciousness of every individual. The 
miraculous paradox is that this universal pattern repeats itself in circumstances that are always 
unique.”26 
As a collective Man, as a human species, though, Ballanche will suggest we possess a 
“general memory which, in one state of consciousness, takes in the life of all humanity.”27 
Through general memory, “each being undergoes all the cosmogonic successions… All that has 
affected human destinies in the future and in the past, echoed within him.”28 This echoes the 
work of Jung on the collective subconscious and dissolves the seemingly-obvious distinctions 
between human minds housed in separate craniums. Ballanche again: “There exists then a 
magnetic chain of universal human destiny, and a continuous chain which sometimes in certain 
privileged moments is ‘wholly reflected in the indivisible light of the present.’ In a simultaneity 
analogous to that of the divine thought, this is the inverse experience of the infinite motion of 
duration.”29 In Malick’s words from The Thin Red Line, we are all faces of the same man. This 
definition of general memory will help us later in our discussion of empathy and its roots in the 
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cortex. If art, then, can be an attempt to glance into the past of collective memory or into the 
future of cosmic time, then 
each glance cast into the depths of space becomes a glance cast into the depths of 
time, and all beings endlessly achieve their becoming. The human being discovers 
himself in the depths of memory and he no longer discovers himself there 
intermittently, fragmentarily, after a blind groping within the gulf of the mind, but 
simply  in allowing himself, in a moment of pure relaxation, to be pervaded by an 
indelible and total memory that is always on the very verge of consciousness.30
The suggestion here is that the experience of time through the duration of existence and the 
understanding of the creative act as an attempt to participate in our becoming, which is 
indistinguishable from present moments of being provides for an account of one human life, one 
united experience shared through general memory and through the ambitious grasp toward the 
sublime. Each attempt to understand our existence and our being in time through the creative act 
is an attempt to intuit our becoming, a state not fully realized until our fulfillment. Malick 
visualizes this moment in the final sequence of The Tree of Life in which all the characters 
reconvene on the heavenly shores. Each character, though, remains untouched from when we 
have seen them, untouched by duration. As Bergson will put it, “to intuit their becoming is to 
intuit their essence.” And so, “becoming no longer signifies being changed by changing.”31 The 
sacred act of creation does not exist in time, but gives birth to it. “Time can always be freely 
created from the present moment forward,”32 Bergson writes. Likewise, “duration is something 
more than history or a system of laws; it is a free creation.”33
 So, finally, creation by God or creation by the mind are rather indistinguishable for the 
Romantic because art is a creative action and the creation of action and of the self. Action is 
creation, the transformation of air into breath and of breath back into air. Malick’s The Tree of 
Life begins and ends with a breath played over nothingness, present at the beginning of creation 
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and the start of his film, and there at the end of what we can only understand to be the duration of 
continual time, an end present at the beginning and yet never fully coming to fruition. It is only 
throgh the creative act of memory that man can fully intuit himself.
 Through cyclical and circular narrative structures, Malick is able to invoke memory both 
through mechanism and through conscious act for the audience, both voluntarily and 
involuntarily for his characters. In addition, his toolbox of repeated images and themes both link 
these three films together into a conceptual trilogy and fortify his idea that the story of human 
experience can be depicted almost archetypically and so, possibly, render the consciousness of 
each individual, character and audience. Malick not only pulls from a rich literary and 
philosophical history in order to consider memory, but, as we will see in the next chapter, uses 
aesthetic appeals to engage his viewers in different ways in hopes of forming and new film 
grammar and a new cinematic means of expression.
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 Chapter 4: Brain Matter
 One of the biggest criticisms perennially lodged against aesthetic theories or art criticism 
in general is the gotcha question, “But isn’t this all subjective?” or “Isn’t it a matter of opinion?” 
To some degree, yes. I do not mean to suggest in any part of this paper that I believe one can 
constitute some sort of Rosetta Stone for determining the most desirable aesthetic qualities of 
visual art and narrative. However, this question about subjectivity and opinion attempts to deflate 
the entire conversation by merely acknowledging the existence of some ambiguity. Fortunately 
for us, there is some accounting -- some common ground, so to speak -- for aesthetic taste and 
how and what many viewers of visual art (or, indeed, natural scenes) recognize in common as 
beautiful or aesthetically-pleasing. 
 The first approach I will examine in sketching some account for aesthetic preference 
comes from the field of cognitive neuroscience. In “The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory 
of Aesthetic Experience,” V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein propose a three-pronged 
theory of art, taking into account the “mechanisms” that produce aesthetic experience.1 Next, 
they propose eight laws of artistic experience in order to ground theories of aesthetic experience 
in the neuroscience that makes such an experience biologically possible. While Ramachandran 
and Hirstein play with and prod the platitude that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” they do 
not dismiss it outright.2 But, instead of allowing that statement the same dismissive power as the 
questions about subjectivity and opinion, Ramachandran and Hirstein take it to be a true premise 
and turn it on its head by suggesting that if beauty is in the eye of the beholder (or the mind), 
then surely all of those with eyes beholding the same visual must share some common 
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experience of beauty and biological and emotional reaction to it.3 In order to get there, they first 
lay out their three-part criteria for a valid theory if it. It must take into account 1. The logic of art, 
whether there are universal rules or principles; 2. Evolutionary rationale; and 3. What is the brain 
circuitry involved? All three of their earlier criteria (to which they refer to the third leg as 
“neurophysiology”) must be present and work together or else suffer a tangible shortcoming. 
Ramachandran and Hirstein further assert that their eight laws of aesthetic experience “optimally 
titillate the visual areas of the brain” and are used intentionally or unintentionally by artists. The 
most important part of their argument, perhaps, is that “art is most appealing if it produces 
heightened activity in a single dimension (e.g. through the peak shift principle or through 
grouping) rather than redundant activation of multiple modules,” meaning, innovative or new art 
aesthetics can have the opportunity to engage the viewer on a neurological level in ways that 
mere repetition or familiarity cannot.4
Early on, they stake the claim that the purpose of art “surely, is not merely to depict or 
represent reality -- for that can be accomplished very easily with a camera -- but to enhance, 
transcend, or indeed even to distort reality.”5 This, of course, becomes complicated when you are 
dealing with an art form like film, whose primary medium is the camera and whose magic relies 
on some sort of simulation of reality, no matter how opaque or fantastic. Film as an art form, 
then, must strive for something greater than representation, while still being rooted in something 
recognizable enough to the audience as to elicit from them an emotional response, stemming 
from neurological stimulation. “Rasa,” they write, can be translated as “the very essence of” and 
can be utilized to elicit a particular emotional response in the audience.6 Art, then must not just 
capture the essence of something, but “amplify it in order to activate the same neural 
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mechanisms that would be activated by the original object.”7 They note that Zeki (1998) 
described the coincidence that an artist’s role of abstracting the essential features of an image and 
discarding the redundant information is essentially identical to what the visual areas themselves 
have evolved to do.8 The artist, the camera, is the eye of the beholder, telling what to pay 
attention to and how to pay attention to it through careful composition and the orchestration of 
mise-en-scene.
 In order for Ramachandran and Hirstein to do any work at all, they must establish their 
premise that there might “be some sort of universal rule or deep structure underlying all artistic 
experience.”9 For my purposes, this should help contextualize the problem of looking at film 
studies through phenomenology. If one could unite the two, then theoretically, we could do away 
with the stalemate that results from the short-sighted preoccupation with subjectivity in an 
aesthetic experience, at least insofar as it applies to my evaluation of Malick’s films. Let’s take a 
look at four of their eight laws which are most applicable to our study. 
 First, Ramachandran and Hirstein discuss the “peak shift effect,” which holds that the 
greater exaggeration of the qualities of a visual object that make it distinct from others, the 
greater the reaction to that visual object as a representation of its “rasa.” For example, if a rat can 
notice a difference between a square and a rectangle by being introduced to a rectangle (in this 
instance) that bears a side-to-side ratio of 3:2, while a square is of course 1:1, then that same rat 
will experience a stronger brain stimulus in response to a rectangle with a side-to-side ratio of 
4:1. The more rectangular the rectangle is, the more it is distinguished in its essence from a 
square, the stronger the recognition response. The principle of “peak shift” plays an integral role 
in Ramachandran’s and Hirstein’s argument because they believe it “holds the key for 
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understanding the evocativeness of much of visual art.”10 This could be stated, in other words as 
“all art is caricature,” though, as they note, that is not entirely true. It does, however, explain how 
the amplification of, for example, a caricature of Richard Nixon, in drawing out and 
exaggerating the distinct features of his face -- long nose, pointy chin -- the caricature can look 
more “Nixon-like” than how many remember the actual man. In highlighting the distinguishing 
features of a visual stimulus, a visual representation can demarcate the “rasa” of a real object, 
even if that visual representation is far from being a mirror image. They explain, “artists may be 
producing heightened activity in the form areas that is not obvious to the conscious mind”11 by 
exciting visual neurons that represent particular memories rather than reality. They also discuss 
the “mnemonic component of aesthetic perception, including, the autobiographical memory of 
the artist, and of her viewer, as well as the viewer’s more general ‘cognitive stock’ brought to his 
encounter with the work. This general cognitive stock includes the viewer’s memory12 of his 
encounters with the painting’s etiological forebearers, including those works that the artist 
himself was aware of.”13 Movements in art can be understood as a peak shift and homages can be 
understood as loving caricatures. In the work of Malick, these homages might be interpreted or 
repurposed as inter- and intra-textual visual references, the repetitions discussed in Chapter 3.
 The second important law from Ramachandran and Hirstein has to do with composition. 
Succinctly, viewers experience “rewarding sensations associated with feature binding,” or 
“grouping.”14 The grouping is a function of aesthetic experience, and this pleasing feeling is 
likely, in my opinion, what helps montage in Malick work. Composition is grouping.15 In a 
visual medium like film, so reliant on shot composition as grouping together similar, or at time 
dissimilar objects, a certain pattern of associations can occur. The consistency or disruption of 
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these associations can please or disorient the viewer, asking him/her to refine his/her 
understanding of the visual grammar previously established in the film. Thus, a filmmaker, 
through grouping and composition, can suggest associations within one frame and even between 
several different frames or scenes through the construction of and complex development of 
compositions and visual associations. 
 Within a composition, a particular element of the mise-en-scène can be favored over 
another, asking the viewer to grant primacy of that character or object over the others. Doing so 
isolates one component of the frame over from the others. While this might seem antithetical to 
the importance of grouping as discussed above, this “law” of Ramachandran’s and Hirstein’s 
highlights the importance of grouping. Instead of isolating one particular component, say, in a 
close-up or extreme close-up, extracting the surrounding elements of a scene from the frame in 
order to suggest or highlight its importance, isolating that object or character from others within 
the frame does the double duty of emphasizing its place atop the hierarchy of significance in that 
frame, all the while maintaining its relationship, or grouping, with other objects and characters 
within that same frame. Directing our attention through staging or the manipulation of focus 
allows isolation and grouping to occur simultaneously in the same visual image. 
 Still, as Ramachandran and Hirstein suggest, there remains a need to “isolate a single 
visual modality before you amplify the signal in that modality.”16 They suggest that a sketch is 
more effective as “art” than a photograph because it isolates your attention to notice the 
enhancements.17 The rest is extra redundant information -- “more is less.” In removing the 
redundant information or obscuring it, the visual artist reduces the visual information in order to 
direct our attention to those features which bear the “rasa” of the real object represented. 
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Likewise, in their fourth law, extraction of features prior to grouping and discarding the 
redundant information creates contrast. This extraction bears a heavy influence on the allocation 
of our attention.
 But, grouping can occur because of motion as well. In motion, contrast occurs between 
dissimilar features that occur in close proximity.18 However, a too-perfectly-framed composition, 
one which is perfectly symmetrical or geometrical to the point of obvious manipulation plays 
awkwardly to the viewer. Ramachandran and Hirstein refer to this as the Bayesian logic of 
perception, by which, “your visual system abhors interpretations which rely on an unique 
vantage point and favors a generic one.”19 To apply this to an overall interpretation of a piece of 
art would be a bit of stretch, but it offers a nice defense for difficult art. In other words, “it is as 
though an object discovered after a struggle is more pleasing than one that is instantly obvious... 
the struggle itself is reinforcing, so you do not give up looking.”20 If this is so for visual 
composition, could it not also hold true for characterization or narrative structure? Indeed, 
metaphors are pleasing because they allow us to recognize and isolate crucial aspects while 
ignoring basic ones. But metaphors can be effective even before we are conscious of them.21 
Seeing similarities beyond where differences are easily accessible, below the surface level helps 
set up a “new perceptual category” which is evolutionarily beneficial and leads to limbic 
activation.22 
 Now, as for the nuts-and-bolts “science” of Ramachandran’s and Hirstein’s study, their 
data relies on accessing the SCR (skin conductance response), which allows us to measure the 
“unconscious mental process” because it exists without the bias of interpretation or censorship of 
the mind.23 It is a preconscious reading of our reaction to visual stimuli, unfettered by the 
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distraction of conscious interpretation. “The size of the SCR is a direct measure of the amount of 
limbic (emotional) activation produced by an image.”24 Ramachandran and Hirstein suppose that 
measuring SCR would produce a bigger limbic reading for a person’s reaction to a caricature of 
Nixon than a real photo because of isolation and peak effect. However, I am uncomfortable with 
their discarding of the manipulations of photorealistic images. A photorealistic image will often 
score lower on the isolation of single visual modalities because they contain so much redundant 
information; however, when applied to film we must always keep in mind that everything in the 
photoreal image is manipulated. Likewise, how much of SCR has to do with recognition of a 
base reality vs. memory of that same object. Even if SCR measures a pre-conscious response, 
does it not still rely on the subjectivity of our memory, which is itself biased by previous 
interpretations of visual stimuli that we have encountered before. This could, in effect, distort 
what our brain deems to be redundant information and what it remembers as essential features. 
Our memory is biased and seems to extract its own caricatures of reality. If we do not have 
memory of that exact base object or event, how is this reading effected?
 As useful as it is towards grounding our evaluation of phenomenology in film studies in 
something concrete and scientific rather than subjectivity, Ramachandran’s and Hirstein’s study 
in “The Science of Art,” is not the final word, nor the most comprehensively empirical, on the 
matter. Uri Hasson and his colleagues were instrumental in bridging the earlier work in 
neuroscience by people like Ramachandran to its application in film particularly. In their work 
“Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film,” Hasson and his colleagues first coin the term 
“neurocinematics” to discuss the application of the study of mirror neurons to the aesthetic of 
film.25 In short, mirror neurons are brain neurons that fire the same way in an animal when that 
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animal performs an action as it does when it observes another animal performing that same 
action. Mirror neurons have been discovered in the premotor cortex, the supplementary motor 
area, the primary somatosensory cortex, and the inferior parietal cortex.26 Humans learn through 
imitation from even the infant stage, and through adulthood, all of us have experience the 
subconscious mirroring of another’s body language in conversation, the acquisition of certain 
mannerisms of another through imitation, or the contagiousness of a sneeze. Some 
neuroscientists have suggested that the discovery and study of mirror neurons can provide a 
neurological basis help explain how humans are able to empathize with others, and others 
believe that mirror neurons not only shed light on the “theory of mind,” but also suggest that our 
skin is the only true marker of what distinguishes one human being from another. For our 
purposes, however, the combination of neuroscience with cinema determines that some films 
exert control over brain activity and eye movements.27 However, the extent of this differed with a 
movie’s content, editing, and directing style. Hassan’s study wants to bring together cognitive 
neuroscience and film studies. 
 Hasson and company begin by admitting that some films “have the potency to ‘control’ 
viewers’ neural responses. By ‘control’ [they] simply mean that the sequence of neural states 
evoked by the movie is reliable and predictable, without placing any aesthetic or ethical 
judgment as to whether the means to such control are desirable.”28 Given that controlling brain 
states is related to controlling mental states (apparently this is obvious?), then a viewer’s 
perception, emotion, thoughts and attitudes can likewise be controlled. The tighter the grip on the 
viewer’s mind, the more consistency in viewer brain response. 
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 Their first experiment involved five people watching The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
for the first 30 min. Activity across the high order cortex and visual cortex were remarkably 
similar (45% of the cortex).29 Likewise, the same film exerted similar control over the viewers’ 
brains by directing their eye movements to specific areas of the frame.30 As expected, a 
structured movie is more controlling of the attention of our eyes than an unstructured movie, and 
the same goes for frames. 
Their results, the correlation in inter-subject correlation analysis (ISC), had nothing to do 
with content, but rather with the structure of the style. To prove this, they presented viewers with 
a 10-minute, un-interrupted shot of Washington Square Park in NYC. It was fixed and unmoving. 
This “evoked far less ISC in viewers than Sergio Leone’s The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.”31 
Hasson and company make a distinction between a structured and unstructured shot, through 
which Malick’s use of improvisational, wondering compositions, while beautiful, could be 
considered relatively unstructured when placed next to the work of Leone or Hitchcock, for 
example. “These findings suggest that a mere mechanical reproduction of reality, with no 
directorial intention or intervention, is not sufficient by itself for controlling viewer’s brain 
activity.”32 Another experiment which involved scrambling the sequence of Charlie Chaplin short 
films showed little effect on the “responses in sensory brain areas (which process the 
instantaneous information within single shots).”33 Processing montage, then, seems to play by 
different rules, and a more complicated editing structure, like the one touted by Tarkovsky and 
practiced by Malick, would throw a whole wrench into the system.
Hasson and company posit that “if a filmmaker fails to direct viewers’ gaze, then each 
viewer will attend to and process different information at each moment in time, which will 
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subsequently increase the variability across viewers in the interpretation of the scene that may, in 
turn, lead to increased variability in the interpretation of subsequent scenes.” This is how a 
scene-to-scene control is relevant to keeping our attention. However, for my purpose, this 
fracturing of experience should have interesting implications of the phenomenon of the film 
itself. As we have seen, the outright disregard and purposeful violation of the rules of narrative 
and balanced composition, as well as associative vs. montage editing, have created a vast gulf 
between Malick admirers and detractors.
Later in their study, Hasson and company found that playing the films backwards in their 
experiments showed a correlation between the variability of the viewers’ inability to understand 
the film -- plot, character motivation, etc. -- and the high variability of activity in brain 
responses. One must wonder: is all of this conditioned?; likewise, is “control” the point? What 
are the implications of a film whose director’s intent is not to exercise this control over our 
attention and viewing? Citing Bazin, Hasson correctly notes that “the more controlled the 
aesthetic is, the further these films manipulate the viewer with an unequivocal message.35 Does 
the control or lack thereof engage the viewer by allowing them to participate in the act of making 
the film, or does it merely make us bored? Too strict a degree of control can lead to 
oversimplified film or propaganda, whereas, as less structured, more difficult, slow or boring 
film, might, as Dargis and Scott argued, allow the audience to participate in the making of the 
film. 
 At the end of their essay, though, Hasson and company ensure that we do not get too 
reductive in our conclusions about the role highly-structured films play in the manipulation and 
control of our attention and emotions by saying that high engagement does not necessarily imply 
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the same interpretation. As Rachel Nuwer rightfully notes, Hassan’s conclusions seem to hold 
more interest for the field of neuroscience, as they suggest just how similar our brains are in their 
makeup.36 But what can these conclusions contribute to the theory of aesthetics or the study of 
film art?
 Ira Konigsberg takes a stab at connecting neuroscience with film studies in his essay 
“Film Studies and the New Science,” published in Projections: The Journal for Movies and 
Mind. Konigsberg begins by establishing this premise: “Viewing a film is not identical to the 
perception we perform in the world outside the theater -- the images are an illusion, and the 
viewing experience is far more controlled.”37 Academy Award-winning film editor Walter Murch 
will challenge Konigsberg’s premise in his classic book In the Blink of an Eye, in which he 
argues we are trained for watching the movies through our practice in day-to-day visual 
perception.38 Still, we allow movies certain visual lapses, like a cut from one locale to another, in 
a way that we would not allow in our day-to-day lives. If you see the interior of your home, close 
your eyes to blink, and open them to find the Antarctic, you would anxiously scramble for some 
explanation. When we blink, cutting the continuous stream of visual information taken in by our 
optical sense, we expect visual scene we had just perceived to be relatively undisturbed, while, in 
a film, we afford the cinematic event greater liberties. 
On the topic of motion, Konigsberg notes that our brain is ready for motion, and thus, our 
attention is drawn to motion. “We find difficulty,” he writes, “in staying unfocused in general or 
focused on a static object for a period of time.”39 He offers this account of attention: “Our eyes 
seek out some focal point, something or some things to attend to in the midst of the image’s 
change. At that instant, countless neurons in our visual cortex are firing in response to all the 
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elements of the scene before us… turn[ing] on our attention. In a short time, our attention (and 
the firing of these neurons) weakens -- unless there is some change or motion of the object itself 
-- and our attention quickly moves to another salient element.”40 As mentioned previously, a 
director and cinematographer possess a great many tools to ease the burden of seeking out a focal 
point on our own. Take, for example, this very fundamental technique:
In what is referred to as “The Rule of Thirds,” basic photography (and, by extension, 
cinematography) divides the frame into nine equal rectangular spaces by drawing two lines 
across the screen vertically and horizontally, dividing the frame into thirds. It looks something 
like this: 41 
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The red circles on the graphic mark the four main “focal points” in the frame, or, the four points 
which viewers first devote the greatest slice of their attention. As noted on the figure, the upper 
left-hand focal point is favored as the primary focal point, likely because, in the West,42 we read 
from left-to-right, top-to-bottom. As a result, the lower, right-hand focal point of the screen 
draws the least frequent and shortest direction of attention from the viewer. Directors and 
cinematographers can harness this principle to establish a hierarchy between objects in the same 
frame composition. Likewise, by cutting two images together and placing the second object in 
the same spot as an object in the first shot, the director and editor can suggest a relationship 
between objects in separate frames, creating a relationship that breaks the walls of the image, 
that goes beyond the mere collision of montage cinema which results in a third, fixed meaning. 
 David Bordwell has written briefly on how our gaze and attention can be directed to 
different points during a static image in order to construct a narrative. On his blog “Observations 
on Film Art,” Bordwell establishes the difference between top-down and bottom-up stimulus 
seeing. He provides the example of seeing an object out your periphery bearing down on you as 
you cross the street. You are likely to react by fleeing without actively processing that it is a car 
that is not stopping, nevermind the details of the car. This is bottom-up looking and seeing. 
However, if you are looking for your own parked car, you might look for distinguishing features 
about it -- the make, the model, a worn-out Obama/Biden sticker -- in order to identify which car 
is yours. This is top-down.43 
 He then applies these schema to a famous painting by Ilya Repin, They Did Not Expect 
Him (or, The Unexpected Visitor, 1884). “The dramatic image,” he writes, “depicts a hollow-eyed 
man, gaunt and wrapped in a patchy coat, striding into a comfortable, middle-class parlour.”44 
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Then, applying the work of Russian psychologist Alfred Yarbus, Bordwell recreates the viewing 
patterns of Yarbus’s subjects. An approximation of their focal points looks like this: 
However, when Yarbus asked his subjects to approximate the material circumstances of the 
family, the attention pattern shifted to this:
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Bordwell notes that “a different trajectory emerges” 45 as the subjects begin to collect information 
about the family by studying their clothes, possessions, and surroundings. So, even though color, 
composition, eyelines, focal points, and other tools direct the attention of the viewer and being to 
form the basis of interpretation, narrative also heavily influences the attention of the audience. 
Indeed, when asked to study the characters for their age, the viewing pattern looked like this:
And when asked to make assertions about the characters based on their costumes, they looked in 
this direction:
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So, the dictates of narrative have an equally compelling power when it comes to directing the 
attention and gaze of the viewer. As story becomes a task, a different pattern of viewing can 
image through different stages of seeing the same static image.46
 Now, Bordwell applies this study to film, specifically Paul Thomas Anderson’s There Will 
Be Blood, a film known for its slow pace and deliberate, often static, compositions. The study of 
viewers’ attention during a static scene about one-fourth of the way through the film shows an 
affinity in the viewers’ look towards faces, hands, and movement. Eleven adults were scanned 
using an infrared camera to track their fixations as this shot unfolds:47 
(Perhaps not accidentally, Eli Sunday, played by Paul Dano, is an unexpected visitor into the 
office of Daniel Plainview and Fletcher Hamilton, portrayed by Daniel Day-Lewis and Ciaran 
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Hinds, respectively). There is very little camera movement in the shot, just a slow, almost 
imperceptible push in. Upon first fixation, the focus point of eight of the viewers (three were 
blinking), looked like this:
(The larger circles represent a greater time fixated on that area).48 What we see is a preference to 
hands and faces, especially those in movement and those Eli, who is the unexpected guest.
 Bordwell’s study also reveals the speed at which a general fixation lasts. On average, a 
viewer only holds their gaze for approximately ⅓ of a second.48 Psychological researcher Tim 
Smith, working with Bordwell, provides a heatseeking overlay on the entire scene. What he finds 
is that attention shifts from hands and faces depending on the dictates of the narrative. In other 
words, in lieu of editing to direct our attention, our gaze begins to settle in focused points on 
characters’ faces as they talk, fingers as they point, and then to another characters’ face when a 
response is directed to them. Smith even points out a shift in gaze during a non-verbal 
communication. When Fletcher Hamilton asks Paul about the saltiness of the water near his 
farm, Paul responds that the water is generally salty. Hamilton slightly shifts his glance from 
Paul, who is responding, to Daniel, who listens quietly. However, the viewers’ attention shifts 
from Hamilton to Plainview, noting this silent communication bears weight on the decision 
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Daniel is making. This prioritizes the silent communication between Hamilton and Plainview, 
while reducing the continued response of Eli into the background, or into redundancy. 
 Smith concludes that this staging technique, using a long, nearly static shot, and focusing 
the characters in proximity to the center of the frame, very tightly controls the viewers’ attention 
while not appearing to be as manipulative as, say, several quick shots between each character’s 
hands or faces as they communicate. He writes, 
By minimising background distractions and staging the scene in a clear sequential 
manner using basic principles of visual attention, P. T. Anderson has created a 
scene which commands viewer attention as precisely as a rapidly  edited sequence 
of close-up shots. The benefit of using a single long shot is the illusion of volition. 
Viewers think they  are free to look where they want but, due to the subtle influence 
of the director and actors, where they want to look is also where the director wants 
them to look. A single static long shot also creates a sense of space, clear 
relationship  between the characters, and a calm, slow pace which is critical for the 
rest of the film.50
Bordwell’s work on the allocation of attention has also given rise to the website “Cinemetrics,” 
which approximates the average shot length (ASL) during any given movie. His study has not 
only demonstrated that the ASL of contemporary movies is far shorter than the ASL of silent 
films or films made during the Golden Age of Hollywood, but also allows for auteurist studies of 
style and technique in regards to shot composition and editing pattern. Though differing accounts 
can be found on Bordwell’s “Cinemetrics,” a trend seems to emerge suggesting that Malick’s 
films have, on average, decreased from a 6-second shot average to a 3.5-second shot average.
 But we must return from this essential digression to place Bordwell’s and Smith’s study 
in conversation with Konigsberg’s ideas about the pleasures of film spectatorship. Konigsberg 
contends that “part of the pleasure of viewing a film is having our attention guided in an 
immediate and controlled manner, having the camera do the looking for us -- following the 
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objects of definition, one after the other, we impose on them some kind of relationship, and 
ultimately, some kind of narrative.”51 However, as Bordwell and Smith have shown, this 
manipulation of our attention produces more pleasure when it functions discreetly than overtly-
manipulatively. Still, Konigsberg notes that “the medial prefrontal cortex is the part of the brain 
that is most responsible for the sense of self. This sense of self disappears and this portion of the 
brain shuts down when “we are engaged in activity outside ourselves.”53 He cites Goldberg who 
notes that during a highly demanding sensory task, we have the feeling of “losing the self” and 
“disengaging from self-related reflective processes.”54 So, when a narrative places a heavier 
burden of interpretation and attention on the viewer, he/she would likely experience a greater 
loss of the sense of self. This argument would seem to suggest that a film like There Will Be 
Blood, while long, austere, and slow, contains the possibility of engaging the viewer more deeply 
in the process of attention and interpretation of its visual language, narrative construction, and 
cinematic semiotics, than a film which perceivably movies faster, but more deliberately 
manipulates our attention through quicker editing and tighter shots, forcing our attention to 
essential focal points and narrative beats, rather than allowing us to discover them ourselves. 
 Konigsberg then responds to Ramachandran’s work on mirror neurons, summarizing that 
the stimulation of our own mirror neurons while perceiving an action of another animal is, in 
fact, beneficial to our evolution because it paves the way for the possibility of empathy, even 
through a screen. He writes, “In neuroscience the distinction between reacting to someone else 
and being the other person undergoing an experience is sometimes obscure.”55 He refers to the 
phenomenon of mirror neurons as an “emotional contagion,” as sort-of emotional memory in 
which one feels and does not feel something at the same time.56 To underscore the point that 
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empathy can occur via mirror neurons even through photoreal images or through the silver 
screen, Konigsberg reminds us of Robert Zajonc’s “mere exposure effect”57 wherein we are more 
affected by an object we have seen before than an object that we have not. Likewise, Quiroga 
and company carried this further to apply to celebrity faces, suggesting that “the degree of 
familiarization” of a celebrity face enhances the emotion we are perceiving as a result of “long-
term memory and not immediate perception.”58 This phenomenon could also attribute strength to 
Malick’s collection of A-list casts as a means for involving the viewer emotionally. So, even in a 
concentrated and manipulated stimuli like a movie, the potential for empathy arising from the 
activation of mirror neurons can be enhanced as a result of “mere exposure effect,” memory, and 
“the degree of familiarization.” 
 In summary, the emergence of neurocinematics as a discipline, that is the merging of 
neuroscience and film studies, provides us with a basis with which to account for collective 
viewing experiences, the potential for empathy while viewing a film, and allocation of attention 
and loss of self. Combining the work of Ramachandran and Hirstein, Bordwell and Smith, and 
Konigsberg, we can determine which compositions are aesthetically-pleasing within a frame, 
how a viewer’s gaze can be manipulated and directed through more than just a carefully executed 
mise-en-scene, but through the implementation of narrative meaning, and, possibly, how the 
evocation of images and memory between images, shots, and even inter- and intra-texually can 
give rise to new engagement with a visual stimulus in film and possibly even splinter the 
collective viewing experience into a multitude of interpretations. Most importantly, though, the 
neurocinematics discussed in this chapter assert strongly that the work of watching a film, even 
the difficult, the slow, the boring, does not dissolve the power of entertainment to lose oneself, 
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but actually enhances it by engaging certain cortices of the brain which account for attention, 
momentary consciousness, and the sense of self.
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Conclusion
 Terrence Malick is unlike few directors before him and remains distinct from his 
contemporaries. Favoring nearly non-narrative, almost experimental films, his works feel more 
like tone poems than the traditional narrative films we have come to expect. However, in a 
medium that has so much unexplored potential, Malick’s films are a welcome change of pace and 
are consummate works of art that need only be understood for what they aspire to be in order to 
be appreciated. Rather than holding them up to the typical standards of cinematic entertainments 
-- character development, a focused plot, “entertainment,” -- Malick’s films should be viewed 
and understood as philosophical explorations of the soul in need. 
 Veering into the semi-autobiographical, Malick’s films pull from a rich history of 
cinematic, literary, and philosophical traditions to make visual stories that are at once intimate 
and epic, that attempt to tell the archetypical story of humanity in different individual 
incarnations. His films, as A.O. Scott writes, are “rooted in human nature but ascend to the 
infinite mystery.” Indeed, the screenplay to Malick’s The Tree of Life carries this note at the 
beginning “The ‘I’ who speaks in this story is not the author. Rather, he hopes that you might see 
yourself in this ‘I’ and understand this story as your own.” 
 While Malick’s goal of mirroring the individual subjective experience of his audience and 
attempting to explore this story fails for many filmgoers, it requires patience and a lens attuned 
to a different way of making films. A reviewer once commented on the film La Quatro Volte, that  
if you let it, it will absorb you in its waves. This is the key to understanding the 
phenomenological expressions of Malick’s The Tree of Life, To the Wonder, and Knight of Cups. 
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Pulling from Emerson, Poulet, and Tarkovsky, Malick’s expression of time through the rhythm of 
his editing and the place of repeated, archetypical images next to one another offers an 
alternative to straightforward narrative structure and provides a route for his characters to break 
the ties that hold him them to duration in their human experience and to become a part of cosmic 
time through the creative act of memory. By evoking involuntary, or associative, memory in his 
films, Malick further complicates this experience of time in an effort to create an Eternal Now. 
 When we understand Malick’s style and technique and attempt to apply recent work in 
the field of neurocinematics to his work, we can at least begin to understand why these atypical 
uses of film grammar are so evocative to some and so disturbing to others. Like Proust, Malick 
and his cinematographer Emmanuel Lubezki, “provide and create a new way of cinematic seeing 
-- because Malick himself creates a new mode of directing.” Loose, improvisational, and mostly 
focused on capturing The Sublime in each moment, Malick’s mode of directing appears less 
staged and more spontaneous, performing in its making what his films attempt to achieve in 
regards to time and creation. 
 As a result, Malick’s pilgrims are constantly wandering along a well-worn path toward 
spiritual redemption and self-actualization in the now. In order to express such deeply 
philosophical and transcendental themes, Malick, like the great modernist authors whose primary 
thematic concern was time, must forge new ways of expression because the ones at their disposal 
do not suffice. Even the final line of Malick’s script for The Tree of Life promises “Time has 
reappeared; resumed its sway,” but this cannot be fully understood without those final moments 
of his film. 
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 And so, rather than maligning his work for its narrow appeal or for failing to live up to 
tired forms of cinematic expression, we can begin to reevaluated the recent work of Terrence 
Malick by resurrecting a phenomenological approach to film studies. This approach gets back to 
the power of the immediate subjective experience, without robbing film studies of academic 
exploration entirely. Instead, freeing it from strict structuralist and formalist approaches can 
allow for and encourage new forms of expression in cinema and attempt to help the medium 
reach its expressionistic potential. The contemporary American filmmaker Harmony Korine 
decries, “After 100 years, films should be getting really complicated. The novel has been reborn 
about 400 times, but it’s like cinema is stuck in the birth canal.” Malick stands at an unique 
moment in film history, garnering critical and cultural acclaim early on and occupying a Salinger, 
Pynchon-esque mythical status in film circles. And so, he seems like a prime candidate to be the 
midwife for cinema’s rebirth. His audience just needs to find him. Because film is such an 
expensive art, the paltry returns on the box office for Malick’s films doom the director’s ability 
to keep making the films he wants to make, free from studio interference or the tarnish of 
negative reviews. However, at some point, that good will from angel investors must run out. 
Until then, Malick will continue to cement himself as a cinematic Emerson, seeking at once to 
glorify the human while transcending him, and being fascinated by time, the Romantic spiritual 
journey of man, and the possibility for an encounter with The Sublime. 
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